

Issue 5 | Cloister Time 2023

The Winchester History Journal



The Winter War

Henry Harring

**Why Lysenkoism Rose
and Fell**

Bob Guan

The United Front

Warrick Kwon



<p>Winchester History Journal</p>	<p>8 — China: The First United Front <i>Warrick Kwon (G)</i></p>
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<p>From the Editors:</p> <p>Welcome to the fifth issue of the Winchester History Journal.</p> <p>This edition is in many ways no different from the last: we have a similarly wide-ranging and well-researched set of articles, from Lysenkoism to Laconophilia, and our usual regular features, including “Debunked!”. We hope that you enjoy them!</p> <p><i>Douglas Page, Jamie Mackinnon and others</i></p>	<p>18 — How Significant was the Treaty of Versailles for Germany? <i>Timothy Olumabusola (I)</i></p> <hr/> <p>22 — Laconophilia: Spartan Imagery in Far-Right Iconography <i>Luca Ryan (K)</i></p> <hr/> <p>28 — Hugh Gaitskell and the Suez Crisis <i>Anton Oliver (H)</i></p> <hr/> <p>31 — Why Lysenkoism Rose and Fell <i>Bob Guan (K)</i></p>
<p>Front Cover Image:</p> <p>Leonidas from the film <i>300</i> (2006).</p> <p>This photo is relevant to Luca Ryan’s article on Spartan imagery on page 22.</p>	<p>5 — From Winchester: <i>Douglas Page (Coll.)</i></p> <hr/> <p>4 — Interestingly; Debunked; Older or Younger; and This Month in History</p> <hr/> <p>42 — News from History Society</p> <hr/> <p>43 — Crossword</p> <hr/> <p>44 — Books in Moberly Library</p> <hr/> <p>46 — NEW: Quiz</p>

Interestingly...

Interestingly, Potoooooo (pronounced 'potatoes') was a racehorse in the 18th century. The origin of the name is disputed.

Interestingly, in English courts, Chinese witnesses are allowed to swear an oath by breaking a saucer, and confirming that their soul will be cracked like the saucer if they perjure. This practice arose in the 19th century because of differences between the two legal systems.

Interestingly, a list of reasons for missing work, from 1250BC in Ancient Egypt, survives. One worker had been bitten by a scorpion; another was brewing beer.

Interestingly, ice-skating was a popular pastime in the Middle Ages.

Interestingly, only two parchment manuscript copies of the US Declaration of Independence survive, one of which is in the West Sussex Record Office.

Debunked!

The Romans did not regularly vomit during meals. *Vomitoria* were entrance passages to stadia, where crowds could spew forth, hence their name.

Adults in the Middle Ages did not die in their 30s and 40s on average. That was the life-expectancy at birth, skewed by a high infant-mortality rate. The true value was in the 60s.

George Washington did not have wooden teeth, although he did have numerous dentures.

Albert Einstein never failed Mathematics or Science at school.

Older or Younger?

Were the following authors older or younger than **Jane Austen**?

Virgil
J. K. Rowling
Charles Dickens
George Orwell
James Joyce
Voltaire
Oscar Wilde
Charlotte Brontë



Answers to the previous 'Older or Younger?':

Queen Elizabeth II
Pope John-Paul II — Older
Pope Benedict XVI — Younger
Ronald Reagan — Older
Jimmy Carter — Older
Margaret Thatcher — Older
Leonid Brezhnev — Older
Mikhail Gorbachev — Younger
François Mitterrand — Older

This Month in History

25 years ago — mass riots broke out in Indonesia, resulting in the deaths of around 1,000 people.

50 years ago — Mike Oldfield's *Tubular Bells* became the first release on Richard Branson's Virgin Records label.

75 years ago — the Israeli Declaration of Independence was signed, triggering a war with Arab states.

100 years ago — Stanley Baldwin replaced Bonar Law as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

FROM WINCHESTER

In this *From Winchester*, Douglas Page explores the history of bells, bell-ringing, and bell-ringers at Winchester College.

Below: The bells at Winchester College on their modern cast-iron frame.



Bell-ringing has had a unique and distinguished history at Winchester College. The College has had bells since the fourteenth century, when it was founded by William of Wykeham, and in the modern day, many pupils are involved in ringing. This article explores the history of the bells and their towers, their purpose across time, and the stories of the people that have rung them.

Ecclesiastical law required Wykeham to obtain permission from Rome to build a belfry. Pope Boniface IX gave him a license to do so on 18 September 1391. The original tower was completed with a lead spire most probably in 1396. It is unknown where it was, but Wykeham's bells appear to have continued to ring whilst it was being replaced by Warden Baker between 1473 and 1481. Baker's tower was rebuilt by William Butterfield from 1862 to 1865 because of structural weakness. This tower still stands.



The College accounts of the late 1390s contain the first mentions of bells: three in the tower and one above the roof. At least one of these bells would have been hung before the first scholars arrived in March 1394. They would have had names, perhaps of a saint, the bell's founder or even a playful nickname, but these are lost to time. Each bell would have been consecrated by a bishop, with holy water, oil, and incense, either where they were founded or in the College. The bells would only have been hung on a limited arc, unlike in the modern day, where in England they are invariably hung on a full-circle wheel that allows for ringing in sequences. There were also three *tintinnabula* bought for use during masses in the College: these were possibly "crotal bells" – small handheld bells with an internal rattle – much like "sleigh bells".

The original bells in the tower would have been used to warn people of upcoming services, those of the “Divine Office” – including matins, mass and evensong. The bells would have been rung alone, in pairs or all together, depending on the importance of the service and the availability of ringers. The ringing for matins would have woken people up for the day’s work. The treble – the lightest bell – would have been rung at the end of the day, at which point people were supposed to say three Hail Marys. In 1281, the Council of Lambeth stated that a bell should be sounded at the moment of consecration in a mass, when the bread was held up, so that people not in church at the time could also bow or genuflect – bend their knee. Evidence of a Christian reacting to a bell whilst working in a vineyard survives from an inquisitorial trial in thirteenth-century Languedoc. In the fifteenth century, a custom developed for a bell to be rung during the singing of the Sanctus as well. The bell above the roof would have had a rope hanging to the chancel floor such that it could be rung during services. Ordinary parish churches used their hand bells to bring the sacrament to the sick, but the clergy of the College would have rarely done such a visitation. Another function of bells was to provide spiritual protection against demonic spirits and storms. After the Black Death, and the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, Wykeham wanted the College to have all the protection it could get, and therefore bells. They symbolised that the foundation was strictly a Christian one.

Each of the current bells has its own story. The treble – the lightest bell – was donated by the mathematician John Desborough Walford in 1866. The second-lightest bell was donated in the 1450s by “William Poorte”, although at the time it was the treble. It was recast in 1659, and like all the other bells, was restored in 1952. During this restoration the lightest of Wykeham’s original bells had a large crack so was replaced by a new bell. It can now be seen on the floor of Thurber’s Chantry and is inscribed “AVEGRACIA”, because it was the bell rung in the evening, signalling prayer. The fourth bell is inscribed, “R: PHELPS FECIT 1737”: Richard Phelps was the founder in Whitechapel at the time. The treble and the third bell were also cast in the Whitechapel foundry. The fifth bell is inscribed: “I.W. 1593”: a founder, named John Wallis, worked in Salisbury at the time. The second bell was also founded in Salisbury. The tenor – the heaviest bell – has the most interesting history. The will of Warden Cleve, dated 30 September 1501, provided funds to buy it. It was then recast in 1523, 1566, 1572, 1578, and 1637. The recasting in 1578 was due to a catastrophe: the bell had fallen from its frame through the clock chamber, the bell-ringers’ chamber, and the vaulting of Thurber’s Chantry, and had landed on Chapel floor. No one was recorded as being hurt. In 1998, a strong cast-iron frame was installed, rather than a timber one to ensure structural integrity.

Right: Record of Warden Cleve’s donation, dated 6 October 1502.

Below: Detail of record.



Bells have always required bell-ringers. However, there is little evidence about them, except in recent years. Some of the ringing has been done mechanically by the clock: it appears that William of Wykeham gave a clock to the College in 1404 that would have rung the bells at certain times. Like with the current clock, there would have been no face. In 1883, the ringers (at this time, adult and paid) went on strike. Around the same time, the first boys learnt how to ring, although this as an activity did not perpetuate. It was only when the adult ringers became permanently unavailable in the Second World War that pupils began to regularly ring the bells, an activity that still takes place to this day.

Bells have been rung for special occasions throughout history. In the medieval period, they would have been rung for major religious festivals. The first mention we have of the College bells being rung for a monarch was in 1661 for Charles II. They were similarly rung for James II in 1687 and Queen Anne in 1705. Because the bell-ringers were paid, the special occasions for which they rang were often recorded: for example, for the victory at Blenheim in 1704. Bells historically have been rung to incite a rebellion: however, there is no evidence that the ringleaders did this during the school rebellions of 1793 and 1818. In 1695, they had been tolled for Queen Mary's funeral. In 1965, the bells were rung half-muffled in memory of Winston Churchill. In 2018, for the 100th anniversary of the Armistice, staff and pupils rang likewise, and in September 2022, they were chimed 96 times and then rung half-muffled, in memory of HM Queen Elizabeth II. Bells were rung in 1686 for the Coronation of James II, and in 1690 for the Coronation of William and Mary. Students will be ringing for the upcoming Coronation.


In summary, bells were an integral part of William of Wykeham's Christian foundation. They originally had a symbolic as well as practical use – their practical use was mostly for religious reasons. Currently, the bells – which each have a unique history – are rung regularly by pupils and staff, including for special occasions. Without the bells and the bell tower at Winchester College, the soundscape and landscape of the College would be markedly different.

Further reading:

Arnold, John H. and Caroline Goodson, 'Resounding Community: The History and Meaning of Medieval Church Bells', *Viator*, 43 (2012), pp. 99–130.

Chitty, Herbert, 'The Winchester College Bells and Belfries', *Proceedings of Hampshire Field Club & Archaeological Society*, 9, pt 1 (1920), pp. 37–80.

'The Church Building: Upper Spaces', in Nicholas Orme, *Going to Church in Medieval England*, 2022, pp. 105–9.



Above: Record of the ringing after the death of Winston Churchill.

China: The First United Front

A Comparison Between the Attitudes of the GMD and the CCP



Warrick Kwon compares the attitudes of the Nationalist and Communist parties in China to the First United Front, 1924–1927, a joint attempt to move power away from regional warlords to the federal government in Beijing.

Above: Chinese Communists in 1949.

1924 marked the beginning of the cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party, Guomindang (GMD), known as the First United Front. Following its formation in 1924, The First United Front played a pivotal role in carrying out the Northern Expedition in 1926, aimed at putting an end to a decades-long reign of Warlordism within China. Major ideological differences were evident between the two parties from the very beginning of the First United Front, but both had the shared aim of ending the warlord period and relied on each other for the successful achievement of that aim. This essay will identify and evaluate these commonalities and differences in the attitudes of each party towards the First United Front.

The GMD and the CCP shared a common aim in pursuing the United Front: to end the warlord period, when regional military generals rather than the central authority in Beijing controlled different parts of China. At the time, warlords created significant economic hardships for peasants, as power struggles among warlords meant pillaging of farm by invading armies and, consequently, a precarious instability of oppressive terror and continued disunity. Most directly, the deleterious consequences of Warlordism were significant for the GMD and the CCP because improving the living conditions of the people was a central goal of both parties. More significantly, Warlordism fell afoul of certain central organizing principles of each party. The division within China due to the presence of warlords facilitated outside interference with Chinese affairs, resulting in the loss of Tibet, Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia during the warlord period. Such a result was unacceptable to the GMD as it violated the Three People's Principles suggested by Sun, the key defining principles of the GMD. According to Sun's principles, Warlordism threatened national sovereignty, as it weakened a sense of unified Chinese nationalism based on adherence to a central authority, making China susceptible to the influences of imperialist powers. Warlordism was equally problematic for the CCP, as Warlordism was

viewed by the Communists as a form of feudalism that China must progress away from, to achieve a modern socialist state.

This convergence in opposition against Warlordism was significant because it allowed for the formation of the First United Front. In the context of continued grievance of ordinary people against foreigners and warlords, the GMD and the CCP rallied around a shared Chinese identity for the First United Front, with the explicit goal of expelling foreigners and ending Warlordism. When national anger towards imperialists and foreign interference reached its pinnacle because of the May 30 Incident, where the British killed twelve Chinese protestors, the United Front initiated its Northern Expedition in 1926, the first significant and systematised effort to combat Warlordism.

On the other hand, each party possessed a starkly opposing attitude about the strategic goals of participating in the United Front. Chiang Kai-shek, who led the GMD during the Northern Expedition, viewed the United Front as a means of eventually annihilating the Communists after defeating the warlords. Following the victories in significant regions such as Shanghai and Nanjing, previous warlord strongholds, Chiang procured the means to purge the Communists from 1926 and to the White Terror 1927, killing over 5000 Communists just in Shanghai. For Chiang and most of his party, the United Front was a success not only because the United Front fulfilled its role of extinguishing Warlordism, but also because it served as a springboard from which to resolve the issue of remaining Communist presence.

This view drastically differed to that of the CCP. The CCP's strategic outlook was that to incite a second revolution which would seek to achieve "the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie," after successfully ending Warlordism. Indeed, the success granted by the cooperation of the United Front gave impetus to the

start of the series of attacks on the CCP made the Communists view the United Front as the cause for its own fall. This contrast is valuable to understanding the attitudes of the parties towards the United Front as how parties evaluated the outcomes of the most important accomplishment of the United Front to be completely opposite of each other reveal the extent to which attitudes of parties differed.

Moreover, both the GMD and the CCP relied on each other's support and assistance for the aims of the United Front to be met. The GMD viewed the United Front as an opportunity to solidify their foreign support. This was important because Sun needed assistance to stabilise the government and he viewed that if the GMD cooperated with the CCP through the United Front, this would encourage Moscow, who Sun genuinely admired the structure of its Bolshevik party, to continue the GMD with money and ammunition necessary to defeat the warlords and create a united China under nationalistic ideologies. Gaining Russia's support defined a crucial moment of the GMD gaining foreign support because in 1923 where the British and the Americans were not offering help but simply rebuffing them, the Soviet's proposal to support them was like a straw held out to a man drowning in a river that the GMD *had* to clutch onto. Likewise, the CCP which was in its formative stages of there only being only 300 members in 1923 needed the alliance as its members viewed joining the United Front as an opportunity to expand its own party membership and recognition using the national prestige which came from Sun's name. To that extent, it can be argued that the CCP valued the United Front more than the GMD did because under the umbrella of the GMD, the members of the CCP were able to achieve significant progress in developing the CCP which took the party out of its infant stages into a renowned political group. For instance, during the Northern Expedition from 1926, the Communists were able to advertise themselves and spread Communism to the wider population by organising boycotts and strikes against the warlords. With each party trying to extract the for its further growth or accomplishment of its aims, it can be found that both parties viewed one another as a means to achieve their own ends: let that be furthering Nationalistic aims and receiving foreign backing or increasing membership. This was a significant similarity as the fact that both parties viewed the United Front as a method to achieve an objective meant that once one party earned what it aimed to gain through the First United Front, it was possible for the party to betray the other. This was in fact what happened after the Northern Expedition in 1927 where confident that the warlords were beaten and hence no longer needed Communist support, Jiang began his purge on Communists, leading to the White Terror in 1927 which murdered 15,000 communists across China. This shows how the attitude towards the United Front was less of an ironclad union, but a symbiotic coalition of the two parties which could falter at any moment. In essence, it can be said that parties shared the general attitude of viewing the United Front as an opportunity to gain access to the unique privileges to the party outweighs the possible differences that might have existed in the detailed needs and wants.

Despite such similarities, the GMD and the CCP had fundamentally differing political principles. This was significant because the discrepancies between the party's principles made not everyone in their parties happy with the United Front for various reasons. To illustrate, inspired by Sun's Three People's Principles, the GMD were nationalists who viewed the end goal of the United Front to achieve complete national sovereignty in China devoid of imperialist powers and warlords. On the other hand, the CCP were Communists inspired by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, who viewed the end goal of the United Front to achieve a complete peasant revolution in China. Hence, many of the GMD except for a few left leaning supporters such as Wang Jingwei were highly sceptical of Communism as it was too radical and unrealistic, given that the Chinese society was devoid of any basic factors for the smooth

development of a Communist state. In contrast, the CCP viewed the GMD and its supporters to be overly bourgeois to complete a peasant revolution. This was because the GMD could not move too far to the left or else lose its main supporters, many of whom were landlords or industrialists and were not sympathetic to the peasants' demands such as lower rents and taxes. Although the GMD did make some compromises in the eyes of the GMD such as adopting Comintern's advice on organisational changes, Sun and his party was careful not to be led along the Bolshevik ideological path. This reveals how although they might seem like they are cooperating to combat warlords, there was consistently an unwavering attitude in regard to maintaining one's party ideologies. Therefore, there were contrasting views towards how each party viewed the other member of the United Front. This was significant because different views towards each other were what could have impacted the solidarity of the United Front negatively, which was the crux of a successful and effective effort to combat the warlords. Nevertheless, the different attitudes towards others' party in the United Front posed a meagre significance on the attitudes towards maintaining the United Front than the previous similarities of sharing the aims of defeating Warlordism and imperialism because it was unable to outweigh such pragmatic appeals of forming the United Front. Furthermore, both revolutionaries viewed fulfilling this aim to be more important as whether they envisioned a nationalist state or a communist state, the warlords and foreign interventions had to be demolished and the United Front was an excellent way of fostering effective action to further their agendas.

Below: Map of The Northern Expedition, 1926-7.



The Finnish Winter War of 1939-40

Sisu, Suur-Suomi & Sauna



In this well-illustrated essay, **Henry Harring** surveys The Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, arguing that Finnish strength and perseverance (“sisu”) were essential in defeating the invading Red Army.

Above: Finnish soldiers taking a break during the Battle of Kollaa.

On 30 November 1939, a Russian false-flag military operation would mark the start of one of the most complicated invasions of the 20th century. This conflict, known as the Winter War, would last for three months, through the winter of 1939-1940. No one at the time thought that Finland, a small Nordic country that had only gained its independence from Russia two decades earlier would be able to fend off the might of the Soviet Union. It was believed that it was close to impossible for anyone to defeat the war machine that was the USSR.

Background

The abdication of Tsar Nicholas II on 15 March 1917 marked the end of the Russian empire and the end of the ruling Romanov dynasty. Before the revolution, Finland had been granted an autonomous grand duchy within the imperial empire. The successors of the fallen tsars were the Bolsheviks, who upon seizing power, would grant self-determination to all national minorities. This did not necessarily mean independence but the choice to decide matters for oneself as an ethnicity. This, however, did not exclude independence, and was something the Finns exploited. Therefore, on 6 December 1917, a mere few months after the Bolsheviks seized power, the Finns declared their own state.

After this proclamation, a civil war ensued. The Finnish civil war was a battle between two causes, White Finland, and the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic (i.e. Red Finland) that occurred in the country's transition from the Grand Duchy in the Russian empire to its own, self-determined state. The Reds (led by the Social Democratic Party and supported by the Soviet Red army) would clash with the whites (led by the conservative Finnish senate and backed by the German Imperial army). This war was fought all over Finland.

Not too unlike the Soviet invasion of Finland, the Finnish civil war was not only an internal matter, and volunteers and foreign forces would come and aid either side. On the side of the Whites, most notably, the Swedish Brigade came in aide (*Svenska brigaden / Ruotsalainen prikaati*) This brigade was a paramilitary unit composed of over 400 Swedish volunteers. This unit famously participated in the Battle of Tampere (pictured). Other "white" belligerents include Estonian, Polish and Russian volunteer militias. On the side of the "Reds", were the Soviet Russians and the British forces from Murmansk.



Above: Civilian buildings destroyed in the Battle of Tampere.

In the years that led up to the conflict, the small country of Finland had experienced a spike in population growth, an increase in industrialisation and the rise of a labour movement. These rapid changes on top of the insecurity of the country due to it passing through an unstable phase of democratisation and modernisation provided an environment in which political dispute and argument could proliferate. Furthermore, the end of the First World War and the subsequent collapse of the Imperial Russian empire had led to a power vacuum in Finland, and thereby a struggle for dominance between the growing left-wing labour movement and the conservative population.



Above: White Guard Soldiers in Leinola.

In February 1918, the Reds orchestrated and performed a general offensive with the military aid of the Soviets. This was unsuccessful. In a counteroffensive in March of that year, the Whites helped the reinforcement of the Imperial German Army's detachments. In a joint effort between the Germans and the White Finns, they captured Tampere, Vyborg, Lahti and finally Helsinki. This overall victory for the Whites did not come without a cost. 39,000 people died, 36,000 Finns and 12,500 Red prisoners who had died of horrible conditions in camps. The aftermath of this victory was Finland transferring itself from the Russian sphere of influence to the German sphere of influence. Furthermore, the Germans had planned to establish a Finnish monarchy. The scheme came to an end when the Germans

suffered a defeat in the First World War. Instead of a constitutional monarchy, Finland became a democratic republic. After decades of splits and divisions, the Finnish people would be united in compromise, religion,

moderate politics and a strong post-war economic recovery.

In 1920, Finland would join the League of Nations with a desire to guarantee it's security, but primarily to liken itself and cooperate with other Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden.


In no way did the end of the Finnish civil war in 1918 mean the end of political instability and the rivalry between the socialists and conservatives. Both the left-wing Communist Party of Finland (SKP) and the far-right Lapua Movement which had led terroristic attacks in the name of anti-communism and even a governmental coup were both outlawed by 1932. This did not however mean the end of far-right nationalists in Finland.



Left: Insignia of the Patriotic People's Movement (*Isänmaallinen kansanliike*).

The post-Lapua fascists that were known as the Patriotic People's Movement not only existed, but had a minor presence in national politics, with 14 out of 200 seats in government.

By the 1930s, the Soviet-Finnish relationship was somewhat unstable as Finland was of great strategic importance and placement for both the West and the Soviets. After the Soviets had been involved in the Finnish civil war of 1918, no formal peace treaty had been signed between both sides. In the years following the civil war, nationalist Finnish volunteers conducted two military incursions into Karelia, across the Finnish



Above: Comic satirising ambitions of Lapua leaders Pastor Kares and Leader Rosola to create a Greater Finland (*suur-suomi*).


Right: Map of Karelian isthmus.

border. The purpose was to annex these areas into a "Greater Finland" (*suur-suomi*), and unite all Finnic peoples into one Finland. On 14 October 1920, Finland and the USSR finally signed the Treaty of Tartu which outlined the border as the one which had existed prior between Imperial Russia and the Grand Duchy of Finland. This treaty was not appreciated by many Finns as they saw parts of Karelia (*Karjala*) as rightfully Finland. This was somewhat appeased by Finland obtaining Petsamo, an area in the Arctic. Arguably, that governmental stance was still very much pro-Karelian, as during the East Karelian uprising of 1921, the Finnish government allowed volunteers to cross the border and support the rebels. Eventually, by 1932, the Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression pact was signed. Relations would not improve however, with only 1% of foreign trade being done with the Soviets during the incredible boom of commerce that was occurring in Finland in this period.

Fighting

Only a few years later, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin turned his attention to Finland, after his campaign of solidification of his party and its purification from revisionism. He was particularly concerned about the Karelian isthmus.

He was disappointed with the fact that his comrades hadn't suppressed the Finnish revolution, and was worried that the Pro-Finland movements in the Karelian isthmus and surrounding areas would begin to encroach on Leningrad, a city that only lay a few tens of kilometres from the border, and practically on the isthmus. Furthermore, Stalin thought that Finland could be used by other western powers to restrict the naval movements of the Soviets in the Baltic Sea. Before the invasion, propaganda that was produced in



the Soviet Union began to portray the Finns as “vicious and reactionary fascists”. In particular, Field Marshal Mannerheim and Väinö Tanner, who led the Social Democrats were targeted by this propaganda. After he solidified his power domestically, Stalin began to drastically change his foreign relations with Finland and began the recapture of areas that had once been a part of the Imperial Russia empire, but now belonged to Finland. This expansion aimed to provide more safety for Leningrad which still lay only 32km from the border.

Negotiations between the two countries were unfruitful. In April 1938, NKVD agent Boris Yartsev met secretly with Finnish Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and Finnish Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. He would outline the Soviet opinion and concern about the increasingly powerful Nazi Germany, and that fighting might break out between them. Yartsev would go on to say that if a threat was posed to the Soviets that they would not wait for an attack passively behind their border, rather that they would “advance to meet the enemy”. Yartsev was told by the Finns that they upheld a strong policy of neutrality like many other Nordic countries, and were not willing to cede some land in the Gulf of Bothnia around Leningrad to the Soviets.

Finnish opinion of the Soviets did not improve as the ‘30s continued as many notable Finnish communists had been murdered in the Great Purge, along with a national distaste of collectivisation. Furthermore, Finland began to collaborate with Sweden in the co-operative defence of the Åland Islands.

Further negotiations that occurred in the months following were not successful. Some suggested land in Karelia in trade for military bases or other such things. It is important to note in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Finland was decided to be in the sphere of Russian influence. This example shows us what the Russian opinion on Finland was.

Below: Finnish machine gun unit in late 1939.



Helsinki, which killed around 100 innocent citizens and destroyed around 50 buildings.

Invasion

On 30 November 1939, Soviet forces invaded Finland with full force. This included 21 divisions which totalled to a colossal 450,000 men. The fighting began with the bombing of

In response to international criticism, the Foreign Minister for the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov stated that the Soviet Air Force was in fact not dropping bombs on Helsinki, rather they were dropping



Above: Molotov signing deal with the USA.

humanitarian aid to feed the starving Finns. This would go on to create the nickname for the soviet bombs “Molotov bread baskets”. During this invasion, a Finnish statesman J. K. Paaskivi brought up that the Soviets had never declared war and had thereby violated not one, not two but three peace pacts made between 1920-1934. This led to the USSR being expelled from the League of Nations.

On 1 December 1939, a Soviet puppet government was set up in the areas captured, known as the Finnish Democratic Republic. This was also known as the Terijoki government, because Terijoki was the first village captured by the Red Army.



Left: Seal of the Finnish Democratic Republic (“Terijoki Government”).

When the fighting began, it was clear that the Finnish army was not only outnumbered but greatly at disadvantage to the Soviets. The Red Army had around 250 000 men deployed on the isthmus, in comparison to the 130 000 Finns. Most of the battle would occur along a line which would come to be known as the Mannerheim line after the Finnish military leader. The purpose of this line was to disrupt the incoming Red Army. The Finns had little to no anti-tank weapons and were severely under educated in dealing with tanks. The main defence according to first hand accounts was firstly jamming crowbars or logs into the rotating wheels of a tank, but later Molotov cocktails were favoured. Notably, the Finnish beverage company, Alko, began to mass produce

Molotov cocktails. However, luckily, most of the fighting would occur in heavily forested areas and thick snow, the perfect environment for Finns.

Unrelenting war would continue all the way to December as the Red army pushed the Finns to the Mannerheim line. Shell fire proved to be incredibly useful to the Soviets as they captured the Taipale and Suvanto rivers. This would become very convenient. A typical Soviet incursion would only last about an hour but would leave around 1,000 dead and 27 tanks destroyed in the ice.

The winter of 1939-40 was exceptionally cold; the Karelian isthmus even experienced a record low of -43°C, in the January of that year. This element would come to be very helpful for the Finnish, as the Soviets knew little on how to fight in this climate. Many Finns who fought did not have uniforms, but had to make do with their own clothing which tended to be their normal winter clothes with a Finnish insignia added. Moreover, most Finns were skilled in cross-country skiing, something too the Soviets were inexperienced in. The extreme cold, thick snow, dense forest and long periods of darkness were used to the Finns advantage.



Above: Artwork depicting Finnish skier troops.

Because their military was underprepared, the Finns executed many guerrilla attacks against the Soviets. This wasn't particularly difficult as the Soviets wore khaki and their tanks were painted in the standard olive paint. This was in comparison to the Finns who wore the classic ski trooper white cape snow camouflage, making them practically invisible. It wasn't until almost the end of the fighting that Soviets began to paint their equipment white. Furthermore, the Red Army were greatly underprepared to deal with the harsh Finnish winter. The Russians had little experience with skiing and traversing snow or dealing with the extreme temperatures. According to Russian

military historians, some 61,506 Soviet troops would either become sick or frostbitten with thousands dying.

Right: Finnish 'Sissi' skier Timo Murama inspects Soviet tracks on Kianta Lake, Suomussalmi.



Throughout the Finnish Winter War, in order to defeat the colossal power that was the Soviet Union, the Finnish would rely on guerrilla tactics. This would be mainly done by the Sissi, which was the Finnish light infantry. To tackle the far superior Soviets, the Finns would encircle the Soviets into pockets known as 'motti' and slowly encroach them as they froze or starved. The Soviets had been brainwashed that the Finns would torture prisoners to death after capture so the Soviet soldier had no choice but to fight. If he didn't fight he would either be shot by his own commander, or be captured. In hindsight, we know that the Finns were far too weak to be able to deal with captured prisoners.

Fighting would rage on in three main areas: The Mannerheim Line, Ladoga Karelia and Kainuu. There would also be more minor fighting in Finnish Lapland. The most famous battleground, the Mannerheim line, would see a different kind of fighting to the other kind seen in Finland. Guerrilla tactics would prove to be impossible because of the terrain of the Karelian isthmus. It is the opinion of many historians that this line was as strong, if not stronger, than the Maginot line. This is backed up by the incredible amount of strong-points, concrete bunkers and log-covered dugouts made across the line. Despite some breaks along the line, the strength of the front defeated the Soviet powers and by 22 December, the battle would end in a resounding Finnish victory.

Other famous battles at the time included the battle of Lake Ladoga which led to Soviet retreat and the Battles of Kainuu, another resoundingly successful victory which led to the Finnish capture of dozens of tanks, artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, hundreds of trucks, thousands of horses, rifles and ammunition. Interestingly enough, the Soviets were so sure that they would overcome the Finns that they had sent a full military band, complete with instruments and banners to perform a victory parade.

Despite failure, the Soviets would eventually break

through the fronts in February. A lot of disappointment and backlash had come from the Kremlin, and in particular, Josef Stalin. He believed that this offensive had been a great humiliation for the Red Army and the Soviet Union as a whole. Soviet propaganda was struggling and on its last legs in terms of defending and explaining the incompetence of the red army. By the first of February, the Red Army, under the command of Stalin, had been massively rearmed and began a huge offensive, firing 300,000 shells within the first 24 hours.

By the 11 February, the Soviets finally came into swing with over 460,000 soldiers, 3,350 pieces of artillery and thousands of tanks and aircraft deployed on the Karelian isthmus. This would greatly outnumber the Finns who had a total of around 150,000 soldiers. This went on to cause General Mannerheim to call for a retreat.

Swedish Intervention in the Winter War



Above: Two Swedish Volunteer Corps posters encouraging Swedes to go and fight for the Finnish. The phrase 'Finland's sak är din (The Finnish cause is ours) showed the strength of the bond and the ties the two countries had. This phrase resurfaced in 2022 as tensions between Russia and Sweden grew as 'Sveriges sak är vår' – Sweden's cause is ours.

There was a brief but victorious attempt organised by the Swedish Volunteer Corps (Svenska frivilligkåren) to prevent Soviet invasion in areas of Finland. They would only be able to aid in small attacks here and there on Soviet troops and tanks. However, they were still able to provide help in major battles like that of Salla and Honkaniemi.

Furthermore, the Swedish military sent an incredible amount of aid to Finland such as: 2,000,000,000 SEK (313,000,000 USD), 50-million rounds of ammunition, 200,000 items of weaponry, cars, trucks, mines, and aircrafts.

Peace negotiations

The Finns knew that their army was slowing and becoming more exhausted by the day and that negotiations would be favourable. The Finns did however attempt to hold negotiations with the Kremlin all throughout the war, but was ignored by the Soviets. International pressure from Germany and Sweden also showed willingness to end this war.

In the Kremlin, commanders and generals of the Red Army argued for the continuation of the war, but the central communist party disagreed as the war had been too expensive and costly, and called for a peace treaty with the Finns.

End of the war

By 5 March, Soviet troops had reached suburbs in the middle of Finland and established bases on the west coast. Finnish peace delegates would go on to propose armistice after armistice and send proposals to the Soviets, but since it was still in the interests of the USSR to pressure and have control over the Finnish government, they declined all of them.

The Finns had hoped for the French and British to come to aid, but since they did not arrive in time, the Finns were forced to accept the declaration of the Soviets, which meant the loss of territory.

The president of Finland at the time, Kyösti Kallio, detested the Moscow peace treaty and upon signing it said the famous quote:

'Let the hand wither that signs this monstrous treaty!'

Epilogue

The Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 provided Europe with a new perspective and insight on how the Soviet Union functioned and treated its neighbours. The Finns would go on to concede almost 10% of their territory to the Russians, land that despite being ethnically Finnish would remain under Russian control to this day.

Despite these losses, this brutal war showed us how despite being at a disadvantage, people can adapt and work together to defeat a once thought unconquerable enemy. Historians argue over which factor caused the Finns to win the Winter War. Some say, terrain advantage, some say foreign aid, but it's undeniable that the 'Sisu', (strength and perseverance) helped defeat the Soviets.

How Significant was the Treaty of Versailles for Germany?



Timothy Oluwabusola argues that the Treaty of Versailles was highly significant for Germany in both the short and long term.

Above: The Treaty of Versailles being signed in the Hall of Mirrors.

The Treaty of Versailles' significance manifested itself in four key areas: the failure of democracy, the economy, the rise of the Nazis and Hitler's foreign policy. Within each area of impact, the criteria adopted evaluates the extent of its significance in the short-term, long-term and the knock-on effects. I will argue that the Treaty's significance fluctuates over time. While it was very significant in the short-term by accelerating Germany's economic downfall, its significance fades in the medium-term as the country recovers; however, in the long-term, it can be viewed as significant due to the Great Depression and the consequent Nazi rise in power that ensued.

The first and perhaps the most significant aspect of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany and the German people was the failure of democracy. The Weimar Republic was viewed as "flawed from...its birth"¹ because of its natural association with the Treaty and national humiliation. In the short-term, the Treaty, in particular, Article 231 (war-guilt clause) was significant as it fuelled extremist myths such as the "Stab in the Back" and led to the Weimar government's labelling as "November Criminals" — causing several uprisings, such as the Kapp Putsch (13-18 March 1920), a direct result of the Treaty's terms (reduction of the army). There were many assassinations of government ministers; for example, Matthias Erzberger was assassinated in 1921 by a nationalist group. The proliferating number of murders and uprisings meant that the government often had to impose its rule by employing the Freikorps, which propelled citizens to further resent democracy and believe that endorsing extreme views was the best alternative.

This can be seen in the significant drop of votes for the Weimar Republic between January 1919 (37.9%) and June 1920 (21.7%), before and after the Treaty was signed. Consequently, the widespread resentment of the Treaty (as perceived) was significant from the onset as it weakened the government's authority; and caused both social and political unrest.

Furthermore, the Treaty was also significant to Germany's early economic misery. The immense reparations of 6,600 million Marks had detrimental effects on Germany in the short-term; this culminated in the Occupation of the Ruhr. However, it is important to note that the Treaty exacerbated the economic collapse and was not the sole cause; rather, war debt and the government's inflationary policies (deficit financing) alongside the Treaty's reparation demands engendered economic instability — this fact was lost at the time due to exploitation by far-right extremist groups. Hyperinflation was a cause of the reparations: a loaf of bread which cost 1 Mark in 1919

rose to 100 billion Marks in 1923.² In consequence, the Treaty was significant in increasing the cost of living, with the working-class suffering the greatest impact.

Workers had to be paid twice per day as their payments were essentially worthless by midday. Therefore, within just two years, the Weimar Republic vote percentage dropped from an overwhelming majority of 37.9% (January 1919) to 20.5% (May 1924). It appears that the drop in votes can only be a result of the hyperinflation crisis caused by the Occupation of the Ruhr, which resulted in significantly decreased electoral success. This highlights the significance of the crisis, a direct result of the Treaty, in decreasing Weimar electoral success and sensationalising the belief in the failure of democracy. Thus, the Treaty was very much significant in the immediate aftermath of the First World War in exacerbating Germany's economic downturn through its immense reparations and its causation of the Occupation of the Ruhr.

Despite the initial problems in the Weimar Republic, it did recover. At this stage, the Treaty's significance diminished due to Stresemann's actions in stabilising the country. In the medium term, Stresemann resuscitated the Weimar Republic through Germany's return to the International Community in the form of the Locarno Treaty; management of finance through the introduction of the Rentenmark; her entry into the League of Nations; and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This was important as powers once again resumed trading with her; this is evidenced by Germany's significant percentage of imports between 1924 and 1929. A considerable proportion of these imports consisted of loans by means of the Dawes Plan, which was vital for Germany's recovery and another political success. This period, the 1920s, was labelled the "Golden Age" as a result of this prosperity. During this period, the Weimar Republic was one of the leaders in industrial production, especially of steel, producing 15 million tons.³ This was vital to the revitalisation and strengthening of the German economy, culminating in German exports rising by 40% between 1925 and 1929.⁴ Germany thereby established good trading networks. Culturally, Germany was a centre of excellence in multiple spheres, including music, literature, theatre, art and the sciences. This led to a reduction in the number of strikes in Weimar Germany, showing increased satisfaction with the Weimar government, which fuelled economic productivity. The Treaty can thus be seen as insignificant during this period (1924 - 1929) as Stresemann ameliorated the German economy, stabilised politics and improved international relations.

The sudden failure of democracy scrambled this vantage point. In the long-term, it could be argued that the Great Depression was the most significant turning point for the downfall of democracy. The Depression wreaked havoc on the economy and led to a rise in unemployment, from over 1 million (1929) to 6 million (1933). However, the Nazis were able to exploit the economic situation and blame the sudden economic turmoil on the Weimar Republic and by extension, democracy. It reminded the German people of the humiliation of the Treaty and hence, through Nazi manipulation, led many into believing that the Treaty was the cause of Germany's economic distress. Every country was experiencing economic turmoil at the time, but Hitler and the Nazis presented the Weimar Republic as solely culpable; this was effective as it led to a lack of confidence in democracy and motivated citizens to support extreme beliefs. This can be demonstrated by the significant rise in Nazi electoral success, rising from 2.6% in 1928 to 37.4% by July 1932. Therefore, it could be argued that Nazi electoral success was as a direct result of the Great Depression as, before the Depression, their vote percentage was significantly lower. In addition, the impact of the Great Depression on Germany was greatly exaggerated by Hitler and the Nazi party. Germany's GDP was still higher than powers like Japan and Italy; her unemployment was almost 3 times lower than that of the USA.⁵ Therefore, the resentment towards the Weimar Republic as a result of the economy, it seems can only be due to Nazi propaganda and engineering, which was more significant in the long-term for Germany as it led to the failure of democracy and the rise of the Nazis. Hitler himself, in *Mein Kampf* (1924), ponders over how a "well-directed system of propaganda" can be utilised "so as to change the indifference of the people to a feeling of indignation and transform that indignation into...the common cry: "To arms again!"⁶ From this, it is axiomatic that the Treaty is a significant tool for Nazi manipulation. Moreover, the Great Depression exacerbated the other overlooked failures in democracy, namely, the overuse of Article 48⁷ to ensure the government's survival and proportional representation⁸ – both highlighted the failures in democracy and were brought back to light during the Depression. Overall, the Great Depression and the Nazi manipulation of it, was far more significant in the long-term as it resulted in institutional change: the failure of democracy. Therefore, these two factors were the more significant, not the Treaty.

The Treaty was again significant in Hitler's ascension to power. Amidst the mounting problems caused by the Depression, Hitler through propaganda and

manipulation had presented himself as the man who would "do away with the Treaty of Versailles".⁹ The fact that Hitler vehemently opposed the Treaty led to increased support, swaying parties like the DNVP into his sphere of influence, resulting in increased Hitler's opposition to the Treaty. The poster below with the words, *Gegen Versailles* — "Against Versailles" — and a chained man underscores the adverse consequences of the Treaty. However, by 1933, Nazi votes were in fact decreasing. This shows that the desire to reverse the Treaty, as opposed Hitler's electoral vote, was the driving factor for the likes of von Papen and Hjalmar Shaft (those closest to the President) in persuading President Hindenburg to install Hitler as Chancellor, oblivious to Hitler's greater ambition. Hitler convinced the right-wing elite, such as Hindenburg and von Papen, who desired to reverse the Treaty, that he could reverse its terms. To them, Hitler represented a means to that end. So, the Nazis were put in power under the illusion that Hitler wanted to simply reverse the Treaty. Therefore, the Treaty was quite significant in the institutional shift from a democracy to a dictatorship; the Treaty persuaded the right-wing elite to elect Hitler as chancellor despite his falling electoral success.

Below: Nazi propaganda poster.



In the long-term, the perception of the Treaty by other powers and the way this affected Germany's foreign policy was significant. Many have viewed the Treaty as being far too harsh, including negotiators of the Treaty itself. This sense of guilt contributed to the policy of Appeasement. In the 1930s, the Allies, in particular Britain, felt that some of Hitler's demands in essentially reversing the Treaty of Versailles weren't completely unreasonable. This resulted in Hitler continually contravening the terms of the Treaty (thinking he could get away with it), until finally, the Second World War broke out. This can be observed by Hitler's increasingly belligerent actions: he remilitarised the Rhineland; secured the right to take over the Sudetenland; violated the Munich Agreement (1938), taking over the whole of Czechoslovakia; rearmed Germany's military; permitted conscription in the army, and raising the number of troops above 100,000; and invaded Poland. This was significant to Germany as it led to her entry into the Second World War. Therefore, the Treaty was once again significant in contributing to Germany's introduction into the Second World War due to breach of its terms and perceived questionability.

However, Hitler's ideologies, as laid out in the *Mein Kampf*, rather than the Treaty, were the main influences behind Germany's long-term foreign policy during the Nazi regime. Precisely, Hitler's ideology of *Lebensraum* ("Living Space"), as documented in the *Mein Kampf*, was the primary contributor to his foreign policy. The ideology manifested itself in Hitler's expansionist policies, by which he took over Czechoslovakia and attempted to take over the USSR; these expansionist policies were significant for Germany as it placed her in another World War. Without the Treaty, Germany may still have entered the war due to Hitler's desire to create a global German Empire through conquest of Slavic States. Therefore, Hitler's main foreign policies were not a consequence of the Treaty but his own pseudo-scientific ideologies, as expressed in the *Mein Kampf*. Therefore, it could be reasoned that, although the Treaty may have been a feature of Hitler's foreign policy, it was not as significant a dictator as Hitler's own beliefs – the latter being very significant in the build up to the Second World War.

To conclude, the Treaty of Versailles was very much significant for Germany across time. In the short-term, it accelerated Germany's economic collapse in the form of the Occupation of the Ruhr and the monumental reparations. However, in the medium-term, the "Golden Age" of Germany causes its significance to wane; the Great Depression, in the long-term, was a significant factor in reopening the

wounds of the Treaty and causing the collapse of democracy through Nazi exploitation of it. Therefore, due to the popular uproar, the need to reverse the Treaty was significant in the minds of the right-wing politicians when Hitler was elected as Chancellor. The Treaty was a key dictator in the policy of Appeasement, which impacted German foreign policy; however, Hitler's own ideologies can counter this argument.

Notes:

1. G. Layton, *Germany: The Third Reich 1933-1945*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2000, p.5.
2. The Weimar Republic | History of Western Civilization II (lumenlearning.com), date accessed [08/12/2022].
3. W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production Trends and Outlooks* (1953), p.1118.
4. The recovery of the Republic, 1924–29 - The Weimar Republic 1918-1929 - Edexcel - GCSE History Revision - Edexcel - BBC Bitesize, date accessed [08/12/2022].
5. Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, Thomas G. Barnes, *The European world: a history* (2nd ed 1970), p.885.
6. *meinkampf.pdf* (greatwar.nl), chapter 13, pp.513-514.
7. Used over 60 times between 1923-1924 alone.
8. There were 20 separate coalition governments during the Weimar Republic's rule (Weimar Germany 1919-1933 (historyhome.co.uk), date accessed [08/12/2022]).
9. *the-speeches-of-adolf-hitler-1921-1941.pdf* (wordpress.com), p.90.

Laconophilia: Spartan Imagery in Modern Far-Right Iconography



In this article, **Luca Ryan** discusses how apt the use of Spartan imagery in modern far-right iconography is.

Above: Leonidas in the film 300 (2006).

What we would define in the modern age as Ancient History may seem to some like a collection of far-distant stories and myths. In reality, the legacy of these times continues to affect our daily life in numerous different ways. Ancient Greece and Rome have greatly influenced the political systems, scientific advances, laws, medicine, and architecture of many parts of the modern world, and these are just two of a large number of ancient civilisations that have affected us, including Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, and Classical China. While much of what we have inherited from ancient periods is positive, sometimes the legacy of the past can have darker consequences, and this essay explores one area where this has been the case- the effects of Ancient Spartan imagery on modern right-wing movements. While Sparta has been an area of fascination for many people in the 2500 years or so that have elapsed since the end of the Persian Wars, the 21st-century idea of what Sparta was, as partially influenced by the often-inaccurate 2006 film *300*, has brought these images into the use of modern far-right movements in a number of different countries. Although this is not the first instance in history where the reception of Spartan ideology has been negative – the association of the Nazi party with Spartan imagery being the most notable – the combination of these ancient Spartan values with the age of the internet and social media does provide a different platform for the spread and development of the legacy of Sparta, the values of which do have significant similarities with those of the modern-day far-right. What is interesting to consider is whether the use of Spartan imagery to support the morally repugnant values of far-right movements is appropriate given what Sparta really was; is the image of Sparta that appears in this iconography a true representation of Spartan ideology and history, or has the real history been reworked into something entirely different over time?

On 6 January 2021, the US Capitol was invaded by a large group of Trump-supporting protestors. Several of the rioters were filmed wearing Spartan helmets, and multiple flags displaying the Ancient Greek words “Molon Labe”, or their most common translation “Come and take them” were also carried by rioters. What first needs to be questioned is why Sparta is so popular with the American far-right? The phrase “Molon Labe” was attributed by Plutarch to Leonidas, as a response to the Persian King Xerxes demanding that the Spartans lay down their weapons, and it is now closely associated with the pro-gun advocates of America, who use the phrase as a defiant cry against the supposed threat of those on the left who would come after their sacred 2nd Amendment rights. At the Capitol, a Confederate Flag was pictured with the phrase “Come and Take It” written on it below an

image of a gun, which summarises the connotations the phrase now holds rather nicely. As well as the phrase’s relationship with the National Rifle Association in the USA, it is also used as the motto of military organisations such as the United States Special Operations Command Central, and it is further used by far-right groups in the country such as the Oath Keepers, an anti-government militia, and the American Guard, a hard-right white supremacist group. As well as the very visible physical association of the American far-right with Spartan imagery, the online connection goes even deeper. The phrase “Molon Labe” is very often linked with “Make America Great Again” and other tags related to Donald Trump on social media, and examples such as the online store “Molon Labe Industries”, which sells a range of firearms, showcase this. In the “alt-right” areas of the internet can also be found a vast selection of memes, videos, and other content echoing Ancient Sparta. One notable one of these is a video by a YouTube account called “Aryan Wisdom”, which edits the film *300* such that Leonidas is replaced by Donald Trump, and many of the Persians by his political rivals, including Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and notably George Soros in the role of Xerxes. This video now has over 6.5 million views, and the comments are full of enthusiastic support for the video and its implications. The words “genius” and “accurate” are used frequently, and there are an astounding number of people writing about how similar they believe the video to be to reality. Aside from YouTube, Twitter is also notable as a place where the use of Spartan imagery by Trump supporters is common, and this is before mentioning sites that are dedicated to hating such as Stormfront.org, which frequently has users mentioning Thermopylae as a symbol to inspire white nationalism. One user wrote that their movement is made up of “modern Spartans, in the midst of their own Battle of Thermopylae, with the invading hordes of the East already well within the gates.” This is a fairly standard representation of how Thermopylae is used as an image online, and it is clear to see that Sparta is present as a theme for both open protestors at places like the Capitol, and secluded hate groups more hidden within the internet.

While the American far-right’s use of this iconography has been thrust into the public eye recently with the Capitol invasion and other gun-rights protests, Spartan iconography has also shown itself in the far-right across Europe over the last decade or so. Greece, France, and Italy all have notable far-right movements which involve Spartan imagery in their propaganda, and even in Britain in 2019 we saw echoes of Sparta’s legacy when the final Conservative MPs who rejected

Theresa May's Brexit deal on three occasions referred to themselves as "The Spartans", and compared their own willingness to stand by their beliefs to the final stand of Leonidas' men at Thermopylae. While these MPs cannot necessarily be considered far-right extremists, other users of Spartan imagery certainly can. In Greece, the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party meets once a year at Thermopylae, rallying behind the Spartan myth and shouting Nationalist slogans. The party has been at the centre of a great deal of controversy around its racist, anti-immigrant attitudes. Here in 2015 was another situation where the words "Molon Labe" were used, as Eleftherios Synadinou, a member of the European Parliament at the time, stated that this "message of Leonidas" was "as timely today as ever for everything tormenting Greece." At the 2012 meeting MP Ilias Kasidiaris said "Those millions of illegal immigrants, racially, are the descendants of the first waves of Xerxes army. Those wretched people, with no military value, were smashed by the wall of Spartan fighters. Now their descendants, bloodlessly, have taken over an entire country and an entire people." It is not hard to see how in this case Spartan imagery has provided a point for the far-right to rally around. The French far-right movement Génération Identitaire promotes the main policy of "remigration", moving those who have migrated to France back to the countries they came from, with the movement issuing a "declaration of war" on multiculturalism in 2012, and members have been filmed carrying out racist attacks and making Nazi salutes. While Spartans may not be the main driving force behind Génération Identitaire the group's symbol is the Greek letter Lambda, representing the word Lacedaemon, which means Sparta, and was supposedly displayed on the shields of Spartans at Thermopylae (although in reality not all Spartans did have this symbol on their shields). Finally, Italy's rebranded fascist party Alleanza Nazionale has used images of Spartans in its propaganda posters, with the caption "Defend your values, your civilization, your district". The correlation between Spartan imagery and the far-right, both in Europe and the USA, could not be more clear.

With the correlation being established, it is vital to understand what has inspired the use of Spartan imagery in far-right iconography, in order to decide whether or not it is apt, and this requires a deeper look at what "Spartan values" really resonate with people, and whether they are accurate to the reality of Ancient Sparta. In his essay *Spartan traditions and receptions* Paul Cartledge describes how the "ruthless devotion to the common good", "sacrifice of private enjoyment", "fierce physical training", "mighty and patriotic warriors", and "eugenic practices" of the Spartans

inspired the Nazis to use them as a propaganda tool. The exposure of children was a barbaric process in which, when a child was born, soldiers came to a house to test the child's strength. Weak babies were left on a hillside to die, or taken away to become helots, the slave underclass. While infanticide was fairly common in many ancient cultures, Sparta in particular was harsh in its eugenics program, hoping that by only letting the strong children survive, the population would become stronger in the long term. For all these reasons, Hitler saw Sparta as "the first *völkisch* state", and their exposure of weak children as "a thousand times more human than the wretched insanity of our day which preserves the most pathological subject." The values that inspired the Nazis are similar to those that are found compelling by modern neo-Nazis, who believe that they share this "ruthless devotion to the common good". In an age where nostalgia for the image of the "strong", "fearless" men of history is rife, the idea of a group of ancient white men coming together in a brotherhood against all outsiders is what many neo-Nazis find appealing. Sparta, as an image, seems to represent that, and the Golden Dawn's meetings at Thermopylae has been described as "reminiscent of the ceremonies" of the Ku Klux Klan. As Cartledge describes the way Sparta appealed to Jacques Rousseau, "Sparta's austere, simple, and uniform lifestyle seemed to him to place her closer than most to the ideally true or pure natural state of human society". To Rousseau, as to people today, the idea of Sparta as the natural state of human society, with a simple and tight-knit community, can be greatly appealing. "Sparta stood for civic morality, patriotism, and devotion to the collectivity both realising the time-honoured dream of an integration of the individual and the collective," writes Cartledge, and Rousseau is quoted praising Sparta for displaying "satisfying habits, a sturdy group spirit, an inclination to do right by one's fellows". Here we see the image of Sparta's values on full show, and it is this that inspires the modern far-right.

While a great many of what we see as Spartan values are appropriate to the true history of Ancient Sparta—in a separate work, *Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World*, Cartledge points out that, in essence, "Ancient Sparta is proto-fascist"—there are also issues with the Spartan myth that must be addressed when considering whether the use of Spartan imagery by Fascists is apt. For example, the Spartan eugenics praised by Hitler, and modern neo-Nazis who agree with his actions (one of those raiding the US Capitol was photographed wearing a "Camp Auschwitz" sweatshirt), were not always as severe as is believed, given that arguably the most famous Spartan king of all Agesilaus II had talipes (club foot). While the

Spartan image is that of an unstoppable fighting force that would never surrender, the Spartans only narrowly won the Peloponnesian Wars, despite their supposed might, and required the funding of the Persians, whom far-right organisations consistently label as the enemy in propaganda, to do so (to repeat the quote from Ilias Kasidiaris of Golden Dawn, “Those millions of illegal immigrants, racially, are the descendants of the first waves of Xerxes army. Those wretched people, with no military value, were smashed by the wall of Spartan fighters. Now their descendants, bloodlessly, have taken over an entire country and an entire people”). At the battle of Sphacteria in 425 BC, 120 Spartans surrendered to the Athenian forces, going against their modern image, and while Sparta may seem like the “utopia” Rousseau idolised, it was, in reality, a place Plutarch described as having a “dreadful inequality”, where “the city was heavily burdened with indigent and helpless people, and wealth was wholly concentrated in the hands of a few.” This does not match the image of Sparta at all, and all of these points are largely ignored in the Spartan myth the far right aims to promote.

This myth has evolved over time, and the ways that Sparta today differs from the real Ancient Sparta can be traced back to the fact that the Spartans were a secret people- Thucydides despairs over “the secrecy with which their affairs were conducted” in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*- and as a result, we have very little writing about the Spartans that is not from outsiders. The modern word “laconic”, meaning “using very few words” demonstrates that it was not the Spartan way to describe anything at great length. As a result of this, we rely on outside sources, and many of those contemporaries who wrote about Sparta had a fascination with what went on there that may well have clouded their objectivity. Francois Ollier first described what we call the “Spartan Mirage”, and Dr Philip Davies sums up the problem well, writing that “These sources provide an outsider perspective which is by turns idealising and hostile, and which in various ways colours our impression of Spartan society.” What is most important for the purpose of this essay is that Spartan values, having been viewed in an overexcited and unreliable way by outsiders, have been distorted to the point that the Nazis, and then the modern far-right, idealise a Sparta that did not in many cases exist in the way they imagine, and that has been greatly altered by the somewhat similar idealisation of foreign writers in the centuries during and after Sparta’s peak.

When discussing why Spartan iconography is used, and whether it is apt, it is essential to discuss not just Sparta’s values, but also the most frequently

referenced image of all those associated with Sparta, the Battle of Thermopylae. It is clear to see why Thermopylae resonates with modern white supremacists, as the final stand of an outnumbered group of white men against a huge, invading force of hostile foreigners could not fit more closely with the insecurity of far-right movements over what the Identitarian movement calls the “great replacement” by immigration and “Islamisation”. This idea of a brave fight against foreign invaders for the greater good of one’s country is very compelling to modern xenophobes, and it is also the source of the phrase “Molon Labe”, making Thermopylae suitable to be used as heavily as it is in the imagery of organisations including Golden Dawn and Génération Identitaire.

Another reason for the popularity of Thermopylae as a symbol in the last 15 years is the effect of Zack Snyder’s 2006 film *300*, based on Frank Miller’s 1998 graphic novel of the same name, and the fact that it was based on this rather than true history is part of the problem with extreme right-wing imagery originating from the film. As well as circulating the Thermopylae myth to more and more people, the film is flooded with inaccuracy after inaccuracy, in ways that make the story lean far more into the xenophobic imagery. In reality, the 300 Spartans were not alone but, were instead leading a combined force of around 7,000 Greeks, along with 300 or more helots, the downtrodden Spartan lower class. Additionally, while the battle did improve Greek morale and help to inspire the eventual victory in the Persian War, the Battle of Thermopylae should, by historical consensus, be seen as a defeat. The attempted blocking manoeuvre by the Greeks only delayed the Persian army for three days, and they would go on to burn Athens anyway. *300* suggests that the Persians were all effeminate and dark, shown in deep contrast to the chiselled, white Greeks. In real life, many Greeks whose lands had already been conquered by Persia fought amongst the Persian army, and the Persians were very close in ethnicity to the Greeks, with Xerxes having a great deal of respect for Greek culture, as opposed to the racist caricature of the film. While the film has numerous other inaccuracies, the most important ones for this essay are those that create more of a divide between the Persians and the Greeks, and those portraying the Spartans’ sacrifice as more extreme than it really was- standing alone without any other Greek peoples. The racist imagery the film promotes, being as inaccurate as it is, aids right-wing movements with a white supremacist agenda, and intensifies the way that the Battle of Thermopylae seems like the epitome of what a man should be in their opinion. Writing about the film’s implications, Professor Obasogie K. Obasogie states that “Persians

are depicted as bloodthirsty savages thwarted in the Battle of Thermopylae by a small contingent of freedom fighters...this eerily resembles Birth of a Nation, the 1915 epic celebrating the Ku Klux Klan's rise during Reconstruction to defend Southern whites' dignity and honour against what were then seen as recently liberated Black insurgents", while Masoud Golsorkhi wrote for the Guardian that "If *300* had been made in Germany in the mid-1930s, it would be studied today alongside *The Eternal Jew* as a textbook example of how race-baiting fantasy and nationalist myth can serve as an incitement to total war."

As well as the film, the effects of propaganda at the time may have helped with the modern exaggeration of the Thermopylae story that exists. Historian Tom Holland has suggested that Themistocles, the Athenian general, created the mythic status of the Spartan warrior in a propaganda attempt meant to inspire the Greeks to continue to fight the invading Persian forces. While we cannot prove this with the material available, it is certainly possible that some embellishment of the Battle of Thermopylae was used by the Hellenic higher-ups in order to give their troops a morale boost in the war. Between this propaganda and the effects of the film, much of what we see in the modern Thermopylae myth is embellished or wrong, but that does not take away the main theme that far-right imagery rests on- that of a small, outnumbered force, defending a country against a foreign invasion. It cannot be argued that the film alone inspired the modern-day imagery if it was already a popular Fascist image used by the Nazis, so *300* can only be said to have made the image more convincing and compelling for modern xenophobes, and to have circulated the Thermopylae image to a wider audience.

However misguided, the use of Spartan imagery in modern far-right iconography can be considered apt for the most part, as there is a fair correlation between the core values and actions of the Ancient Spartans and those of modern far-right movements, but it is important to note the many inaccuracies these movements promote in their depiction of Sparta. The Spartans were, as Cartledge puts it, "proto-fascists", and many of the most conspicuous values of the Spartans, including "patriotism", the "integration of the individual and the collective", and a "sturdy group spirit" combined with their eugenics program, ensure that both the Nazis and modern neo-Nazis have reason to look upon Ancient Sparta as matching their ideals. While there are a number of falsehoods and inaccuracies across the Spartan image, some coming from the modern day with the historically inaccurate *300*, others coming from deep in the past with the way

our perception has been skewed by the "Spartan Mirage", the essence of the Spartan image has not been radically changed by these. Although we cannot know for sure if it is correct due to the secrecy of the Spartans themselves, the image of Sparta and Thermopylae that has been passed down over the centuries has always retained its core- that is, with Sparta as a place with a simple, effective lifestyle which bred great and fearless warriors, and with Thermopylae as a battle where sacrifice and patriotism helped the eventual defeat of a vast invading foreign army. The movements that use Spartan imagery have committed many racist atrocities, and often do go against the idea of what a Spartan should have been like, but it is very difficult to deny that the imagery of Thermopylae matches the imagery of modern American Xenophobes, or that the eugenics program of Sparta does match the wishes of many neo-Nazis, however contemptible. Ultimately, Cartledge is correct when he calls the Spartans proto-fascists, as their values are in many ways very similar to those of the movements and organisations that came after. Even if the extent to which the Spartan image matches the far-right has been distorted over time, with considerable error in the details, the basic message remains. It is fitting to compare neo-Nazis, fascists, right-wing extremists, and xenophobes to the people of Ancient Sparta, as they do share many of the same abhorrent values, so while a man in a Spartan helmet invading the Capitol is not the same as Leonidas defending Greece, in his eyes, that man is also making a stand against a larger force of invading foreigners. Though it is not correct for him to think this, given that he does, it is indeed apt that he should look to Thermopylae for his iconography.

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Hugh Gaitskell and the Suez Crisis



Anton Oliver argues that the UK Government should have listened to Hugh Gaitskell's advice about the Suez Crisis.

Above: The Suez Canal from the air.


The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a significant event in the history of the last 100 years, a moment which changed the worldwide perception of the biggest global superpowers, acting as a point where the torch was passed on from the colonial powers of the preceding centuries such as Britain and France to the modern powers of America and the USSR. The catalyst of the Suez Crisis was the sudden nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian President, which was followed by a military intervention in Egypt by the UK, France, and Israel. Hugh Gaitskell, an Old Wykehamist and the leader of the British Labour Party at the time, played a key part in opposing the forceful intervention and advocating for a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

The Suez Canal was built in the ten years from 1859 to 1869 when the Ottoman empire gave the French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps permission to construct it and a 99 year lease over the canal and the area surrounding it. Once it was completed it quickly became one of the most important naval passageways in the entire world, allowing the connection from Europe to Asia across the sea much faster. Where previously the travel between the two continents would have taken a trip around the bottom of Africa, there was now a shortcut to allow connection of empires to work much more efficiently. This was very much the case for Britain, France and other European colonizing nations. For Britain, it initially helped a link between the home isles and India, the largest section of its empire, but later shifted to helping supply the

country with vast amounts of oil from the Gulf region. For others, it helped control and govern their empires as well as in some instances even gain more territory. France was the majority shareholder of the canal, owning a 52% share. By 1875, the Egyptian government had run out of money and resorted to sell their 44% stake in the canal's operation to the British, giving them increased control. As the years leading up to the start of the 20th century passed, the control of the waterway fell further and further into British hands as in 1882 the Anglo-Egyptian war gave them power over the workings and the finances. Eventually in 1888 it was declared neutral, but under British protection. By the time of the Suez Crisis, the canal had become invaluable for the whole of Europe, as two thirds of the continents oil passed through it – around 1,200,000 barrels a day.

The invasion of Egypt by British and French troops known as the Suez Crisis started in late October of 1956, and more than two months before that, on the 26th of July, Hugh Gaitskell started showing his support of controlled military action in the area. He was not completely against the idea of using force, in fact he showed his support in a dinner with King Faisal II of Iraq, while talking to Prime Minister Anthony Eden and the Chancellor Harold Macmillan. He told them that although he backed the use of force and that they would have public opinion doing it, he told them that they must keep the Americans involved. He kept to these ideas by publicly condemning the Egyptian President Colonel Gamal

Below Left: Anthony Eden, Prime Minister. ***Below Right:*** Hugh Gaitskell, OW and Leader of the Opposition.



Abdel Nasser's actions in a speech in the house of commons a day later. Over the coming days and weeks, Gaitskell refined his opinion on the situation and advised the government to involve the United Nations and not go into Egypt on their own. Gaitskell did not make this point very clear and publicise it very much, as he thought that Eden was aware of risks and so did not press it. His main effort was to uphold the preservation of international law and to do nothing damaging.



Above: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian President.

In hindsight it is easy to see that the advice given by Gaitskell was correct, and had the Tory government listened to it, then the whole situation of the US condemning Britain and France may have been avoided. This strained the relationship between the countries who had been key allies to each other. As well as the international embarrassment, there were two other potential disasters, which may have come out of the Suez crisis, had the troops not withdrawn at the right time. The first of these situations was the government of the United States threatening to implement economic sanctions and sell their huge bonds in the British pound sterling, an action that may have completely crashed the economy, making the country even weaker than it had already come through losing colonies. This would have likely dominoed into the invasion of Qatar or Kuwait to keep the country supplied with enough oil. The other potential disaster was the threat from the Soviet Union that they would

send missiles, attacking Britain, France and Israel if soldiers were not withdrawn before the 5th of November. This caused havoc and distress and eventually forced the countries to hold a ceasefire. With this threat, it showed how much the USSR were prepared to do to protect Egypt and the Arab world. Luckily it did not come to the launch of rockets and the start of the third world war. Through listening to his political opponent, Anthony Eden may have prevented this and saved Britain a lot of embarrassment.

On the other hand, there are also arguments against the idea that the government should have listened to Gaitskell's advice about the Suez Crisis. The main point that they present is the fact that at the time it was not known what the outcome would be and the majority of the officials thought that it would be easy to prevent the nationalisation and that the situation would be over and done with very quickly. The main support for this argument would be the fact that the canal was just so important for the British and the French and that they needed to do anything possible to protect their use of it. They felt that it was utterly vital and that Nasser's actions threatened that. Had they let Nasser do what he wanted and not made any intervention, they may have lost their status of world powers. Additionally, the intervention was supported by many within the Labour Party and the government, who saw it as a way to assert Britain's power and influence on the global stage. Anthony Eden's premiership also seemed to be on the verge of collapse at that point and he needed to do something to restore the confidence of the British voters. In this context, it can be argued that the intervention was necessary to address the threat posed by Nasser and to maintain British interests in the region.

To conclude, as Hugh Gaitskell's advice was not followed, we cannot say for certain that it would have worked. While there are arguments in favour of the idea that the government should have listened to Gaitskell's advice, there are also counterarguments that support the intervention. Considering the advice of Gaitskell may have stopped the start of an international embarrassment and so ultimately, we have to conclude that this would have been the better idea. The decision to intervene was a difficult one and was influenced by a range of factors, including the Cold War, the changing global order, and the desire to protect British interests. Whilst a peaceful solution may not necessarily have worked, the Suez Crisis serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of military intervention and the importance of finding peaceful solutions to conflicts.

Why Lysenkoism Rose And Fell

A Comparison Between The USSR and PRC



Bob Guan compares the rise and fall of Lysenkoism, a hereditary theory, in China and the Soviet Union in a thorough and well-researched essay.

Above: Trofim Lysenko.

Abstract

Lysenkoism was a hereditary theory proposed by Soviet agronomist, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, which achieved state-supported monopoly in both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, resulting in disastrous consequences for genetics research in both countries. Though the chronology and impacts of Lysenkoism are well understood, the reasons for its adoption have not received sufficient attention. This study evaluates the root causes underlying the rise and fall of Lysenkoism in both the USSR and the PRC through an examination of the following factors: Lysenkoism's contribution to a stateless society, whether Lysenkoism was evaluated as revolutionary or reactionary, how Lysenkoism fit into Sino-Soviet relations and the aesthetics of a nation, and Lysenkoism's rise to prominence in relation to alleged increases in grain production. This study argues that Lysenkoism rose more quickly and declined more slowly in the Soviet Union because its utility went beyond agricultural output, allowing the Soviet Union to forge stronger forms of nationalism. The inverse was true in China, where Lysenkoism's promotion actively alienated the intelligentsia. The reason for this difference can be explained by the Soviet paradigm of conjoining science and politics, which the PRC lacked.

Introduction

Trofim Denisovich Lysenko (1898-1976) was an influential Soviet-Ukrainian Agronomist whose theories of inheritance, dubbed Lysenkoism or Michurin-Biology, gained a state-supported monopoly in the Soviet Union between 1948 to 1964 and the People's Republic of China from 1952 to 1956. In both nations, Lysenkoism was recognized as a valuable tool for either ideological or utilitarian reasons. Unlike Mendalism-Morganism, which proposed a theory of heredity based on pre-determined genetics, Lysenkoism postulated that acquired traits are instead passed onto subsequent generations. As Lysenko wrote, 'heredity is the effect of the concentration of the action of external conditions assimilated by the organism in a series of preceding generations.'

Lysenko's ideas appealed to the Leninist principle of partisanship in science (*partiinost'*), which held that scientific theories inherently reflected the state within which they were produced. Mendalism-Morganism, developed and articulated in the west, was consequently regarded as 'bourgeois science'. Lysenkoism meanwhile was emblematic of the new 'revolutionary science' in the Soviet Union. Instead of experimentation, Lysenko's theories were evaluated against their compatibility with Marxism-Leninism.

For instance, Lysenko propagated the malleability of human nature, allowing for adaptation to revolutionary changes. To explain the specific factors that resulted in the adoption and abandonment of Lysenkoism in both the USSR and the PRC, this study will first present a chronology of Lysenkoism, exploring its central conceptions and framing them historically.

Lysenko had harshly criticized classical genetics as early as 1934, decrying the existing scientific field to be hostile to all those who supported Marxism. While the onset of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 temporarily paused biological debates, they resumed in the war's aftermath. By 1946, Lysenko had begun losing his dominant position in the scientific community as researchers criticized his dictatorial methods and role in biology and agronomy, citing poor or falsified results. Despite this, he retained the support of Joseph Stalin (1878-1953), who wrote to Lysenko in 1947:

'I think that the Michurinist view is the only scientific view. The Weismannists... do not deserve the right to speak a long time about them.'

Lysenko nevertheless sent a letter seeking official support in 1948 to Stalin, who responded by allowing him to formally label genetics a 'bourgeois perversion'. Immediately after this exchange, the VKP (b) Politburo declared that research or discussion of genetics would be prohibited in the Soviet Union. To accommodate this, the party drafted a decree, edited by Stalin and Lysenko, which was presented by Lysenko at the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL) conference of August 1948.

Somewhat paradoxically, a 1950 address by Stalin published in *Pravda*, titled *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics*, stated that 'no science can develop and flourish... without freedom of criticism'. This text facilitated critique of Lysenkoism in the Soviet botany journal *Botanicheskii zhurnal* in 1952, even though it was quickly refuted. In the wake of Stalin's death in 1953, the significance of Lysenkoism waned. From 1955 to 1963, Lysenko's monopolistic grasp on Soviet biology began to loosen. Lysenko finally lost control of VASKhNIL in 1962. After the deposition of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) in 1964, Lysenko was found to have fabricated data to cover up lackluster results. The following year, Lysenko was relieved of his position as Director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences.

In comparison, Lysenkoism's success in China closely tied to Sino-Soviet cooperation in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in particular through the Sino-

Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA) and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). Luo Tianyu (1900-1980), a senior Communist Party of China (CPC) cadre, was charged by the Ministry of Agriculture with promoting Lysenkoism, known as Michurin-Biology in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Various Northeastern agricultural schools and research centers were co-opted, establishing a hub of translation and publication designed to promote Lysenko's ideas. By the early 1950s, the Michurin research society had been established. Despite the publication and dissemination of Lysenko's works, the Ministry of Education, university biology departments, and even members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) were left in the dark.

In early 1950, Luo was appointed dean of the newly founded Beijing Agricultural University. Unilaterally, Luo shifted curriculums towards Lysenkoism, alienating key faculty. As a result of dissent, however, Luo was removed from deanship by the CPC's Central Committee, which began formulating a formal plan to deal with Lysenkoism.

In 1952, the *People's Daily* admonished Luo for fostering divisions between party and non-party intellectuals. The newspaper noted that Marxist-Leninism required distinct approaches towards science and politics:

'If some parts of the old biology are demonstrated to be false science... then these must be reformed.'

The *People's Daily* gives insight into the PRC's limited and cautious support for Lysenko. Nonetheless, western genetics was not restored to university curriculum. Instead, the party explicitly endorsed Lysenkoism, stating bluntly that Michurin-Biology was practical, demonstrable, and improved agricultural yields in comparison with genetics, which remained theoretical and a waste of time. The party banned the study of genetics and challenges to Lysenkoism, though scientists were not required to acknowledge the validity of Lysenkoism or teach it in their curriculum. The acceptance of non-endorsement represented an unwillingness to alienate Chinese scientists by fully committing to Lysenkoism, a sentiment that only grew over the following years.

In October 1954, a series of CAS-published pamphlets detailing the academic debate within the Soviet Union on Lysenkoism began to circulate. Chinese Lysenkoites responded by defending Michurin biology the following year, noting that Lysenkoism would thrive even in the absence of Communist Party support. Support nevertheless came. In addition to the defensive literature, punishment and censorship of western-trained scientists surged. Those who dared to warn against unquestioned adherence to Lysenkoism

were publicly reprimanded.

This did not stop Lysenko's fall. In 1949, Hans Stubbe (1902- 1989), President of the East German Academy of Agricultural Science, began testing Lysenko's claims concerning 'vegetable hybridization.' Over a five-year period, he discovered 'no evidence of the existence of the phenomenon.' Stubbe presented his findings to the Beijing Agricultural Institute after an invitation by the CAS in 1955, conveying to the CPC General Committee Lysenko's incompetence and stimulating further discussion on 'the genetics question'. Given the coming second Five Year Plan, 'the genetic question' became entangled with the PRC's wider dependency on Soviet scientific expertise and concerns of its hampering the development of China's own intellectual class. In response to this dilemma, the party decided to first ease its 'state of estrangement' with Chinese intellectuals and scientists.

The 'Hundred Flowers, Hundred Schools' campaign began in early 1956. It aimed to liberalize party-intellectual relations and encouraged open criticism in order to allow the Chinese scientific community to develop independently. The decree outlawing genetics and monopolizing Lysenkoism was rescinded. Michurin and Morgan were given parity. At Chairman Mao Zedong's (1893-1976) request, Lu Dingyi (1906-1996), chair of the Central Committee Propaganda Department, organized a genetics Symposium in Qingdao. He presented participants with a series of guidelines, renouncing the Soviet Communist Party's decision to give Lysenkoism special status and declaring that the CPC would leave scientific controversies to the scientific community. The status of philosophy in science was to be depoliticized and decided by scientists. Lysenkoism's monopoly came to an end. Science was now above the realm of politics and ideology. By the early 1960s, Lysenkoism had all but disappeared from China. Though some followers remained, they lacked public support and influence.

Contemporary research on T. D. Lysenko and Lysenkoism focuses primarily on biographical studies of Lysenko, such as Zh. A. Medvelev's 1969 work *Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* or on his impacts upon the scientific community, such as V. N. Soyfer's *The consequences of political dictatorship for Russian science* in 2001. The 'how' and 'what' of Lysenko's rise and fall have been explored in detail, but little research examines the 'why.' Officially, Lysenkoism was promoted in the Soviet Union for ideological reasons. Megay's *Lysenkoism and the Stateless Society* (1953) explores the political dynamics underlying the theory's acceptance, linking political support to the transition from socialism and communism. Megay argues that if Lysenko were correct, any characteristics of a living being, be it plant or human, would be infinitely

malleable and inheritable under the correct environmental conditions. As a result, a stateless society would no longer need to worry about maintaining and surveilling everyone's 'habits' over time, as class-consciousness would be passed on hereditarily across generations. In spite of this logical attraction for party elites, Megay concludes that this had little to do with Lysenkoism's adoption. On the other hand, Yi's 2021 paper, *Dialectical Materialism Serves Voluntarist Productivism: The Epistemic Foundation of Lysenkoism in Socialist China and North Vietnam*, suggests that Lysenkoism's success in the PRC centered on its utilitarian optimization of agricultural production. Though both publications offer in-depth support for their theses through country-specific examinations of Lysenkoism, they fail to factor in other causes for Lysenkoism's proliferation, such as nationalism in the Soviet Union.

The following study aims to challenge traditionally held views on the propagation of Lysenkoism and to suggest reasons for its adoption in the USSR and the PRC. By contrast, a comparative approach allows for an examination of Lysenkoism across countries and a more robust evaluation of the causes leading to its promulgation. This approach is preferable to developing a single country analysis since it reveals the factors underlying Lysenkoism's success to be critically examined by looking for the absence, presence, and specific manifestations of these factors across geographies. This study utilizes John Stuart Mill's Method of Agreement through a consideration of common causal factors for Lysenkoism's promotion across both nations, and John Stuart Mill's Method of Difference by considering how distinct causal factors across the two countries resulted in different receptions of Lysenkoism.

Section one of this essay asks to what extent the success of Lysenkoism derived from its adherence to communist ideology and forwards distinct conclusions for the USSR and the PRC context. In the Soviet Union, Lysenkoism received support given its underpinning of theories centered on a stateless society, though Stalin never publicly announced this for his own goal of strengthening the state. In the PRC, the ideological value of Lysenkoism was never considered in relation to adoption. This emanates from the historical absence of coupling science and politics within China.

Section two of the essay will examine how Lysenkoism augmented partisanship or *partiinost'* in science. In both nations, Lysenkoism was initially treated as a proletarian science, leading to its monopolization of biology. In part because it was denigrated as a reactionary science after Stalin forbid censorship in science, Lysenkoism declined gradually in the USSR. In the PRC, Lysenkoism never became

"reactionary," but was instead seen as equal to genetics. Despite this, the decline of Lysenkoism was far more dramatic and rapid during the Hundred Flowers Movement. This is a significant given not only the greater rapidity with which it was discredited, but because it came within a depoliticized environment.

The paper's third section explores Lysenkoism's relationship to the promotion of national cultures and international relationships between the Soviet Union and China. Within the Soviet Union, Lysenkoism's contributions to Soviet Realism made it popular with Stalin and Khrushchev who used it to promote greater nationalism. In the PRC, Lysenko's initial popularity within the party emanated from Mao's trust in Soviet scientific advancement and his willingness to follow Stalin. The decline of Lysenkoism coincided with the doctrine's decline.

The essay's final section frames Lysenkoism within a wider socio-political context and examines its actual scientific utility. Both countries promoted Lysenkoism at least partially to improve agricultural yields. In the Soviet Union, Lysenko's lackluster results gained little attention until the Brezhnev era, after which he was dismissed. In the PRC, Lysenko's denunciation was quickly noted by the central party, which ordered a further investigation of Lysenkoism. Each country assessed utility in distinct ways that evolved over time. Because of the employment of ideas, such as proletarian science, to create an artificial academic divide between the Soviet Union and the west, Lysenkoism remained useful for reasons other than agricultural yields. To account for shifting conceptual definitions over time, this study adopts more flexible terms and remains sensitive to such changes.

The key difference pertaining to support for Lysenkoism across China and the USSR centered on the Soviet Union linking politics and science, a factor absent in China. Though both the Soviet Union and China adopted Lysenkoism partially to stimulate agricultural production, Lysenkoism served Stalin's aims by demonstrating the supremacy of Soviet science, proving useful in spite of lackluster agricultural results and losing purchase slowly. In contrast, its promotion alienated Chinese scientists from Mao. In the PRC, Lysenkoism proved a liability and led to a quicker fall from scientific grace.

Lysenkoism's ties with communist theory

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's (1870-1924) *State and Revolution* failed to explain how exactly to advance society from socialism to higher communism. Lenin addressed this dilemma by arguing that the transition to a stateless society could be brought about through a fundamental change in human nature through

individual internalization of socialist tenets. However, as Lenin recognized, 'by means of what practical measures humanity will proceed to this supreme aim we do not and cannot know.' The causes underlying this transformation find no explicit articulation in Lenin's writing. Rather, it is an act of faith.

The inability to demonstrate the ways human nature could be permanently remolded, while insisting on their fundamental importance, remained a weakness of communist theory throughout the 20th Century. Though there is no evidence to suggest that Lysenko conceived of this as a problem to be solved, his hereditary theories offered scientific justification for Lenin's contention.

Lysenko's theories concerning heredity stated that new varieties might be produced by exposing specimens of an old variety to specific environmental conditions at the right time. Though originally applied to vegetable cultivation, his theory could be extended to all life. Thus, as E. N. Megay argued in his 1953 work, *Lysenkoism and the Stateless Society*, the 'new Marxian man' could be created through a change in circumstances. Environmental stimuli designed to instill Marxism, already present in the USSR, would provide the change in circumstances required. This would render the state of the USSR and its dictatorship of the proletariat an ephemeral entity, an institute of education facilitating the path to higher communism.

However, Lysenkoist contributions to the advancement to a stateless society were never acknowledged. Joseph Stalin believed in Lysenkoist heredity, yet he never explicitly linked it to pathways leading from Socialism to higher Communism. Stalin wrote that the transition to communism would be achieved through the 're-education of the people.' Stalin employed the term education in the broadest sense possible, encompassing all activities that help form or reform the minds of any individual across any age group. In Stalin's later years, he demanded the development of a 'new man' better fit for life under communism. Stalin believed in education comprised a set of greater environmental factors and anticipated that it would bring about new men adapted to their environment. This paralleled Lysenkoist heredity and suggests that Stalin endorsed it given these affinities, omitting direct mention of Lysenkoism given his own conceptions of the state's role.

Stalin argued against 'helping the socialist state die away,' citing its necessity as a bulwark against 'capitalist encirclement,' which would 'attack' communist nations 'by armed force.' This dovetails with how Stalin believed a stateless society would come about, 'not through a weakening of the state power, but through its strengthening to the utmost (maksimal'noe usilenie).' Only when most of the world

had adopted socialism could the state 'die away'.

When applied to political formations, Lysenkoist heredity would relegate the state to a transient entity. If all learned factors of socialist life passed to subsequent generations and all organisms remained infinitely malleable, there would be no reason why the new worker could not be taught how to resist reactionary influence and for their kin to inherit this teaching. The state would lose its purpose over time. If Stalin wished to further his agenda of strengthening the state, it would have been against his interests to apply Lysenkoist heredity to broader society and political formations.

For Stalin, Lysenkoism hung ideologically between the useful and the devastating. Stalin likely privately supported and called for the proliferation of Lysenkoism because of its ideological importance. However, Stalin could not openly admit to the role of Lysenkoist heredity in achieving a stateless society, since this would undermine his goal of strengthening the state. On ideological grounds, Lysenko's support in the Soviet Union was sub-textual. Lysenkoism gained public prominence not because of its contribution to a stateless society, but in spite of it.

Unlike in the Soviet Union, many bourgeois in China supported the revolution. Mao observed in 1939, prior to the decolonization of China, that the petty national bourgeoisie were 'oppressed by imperialism and fettered by feudalism,' just like the proletariat. However, the bourgeoisie still '[had] economic ties with imperialism and feudalism,' rendering them unreliable allies for communist revolutionary forces. This gave them a dual character, capable of emerging a revolutionary ally or reactionary enemy. In 1949, after the CPC's victory in the Chinese Civil War, Mao declared that the time had come to formally 'reform' and 'educate' the national bourgeoisie in socialism through rehabilitation.

Lysenkoism and the belief of beings infinite malleability merged with Mao's idea of reform. Despite this, Mao never adopted this particular line of argument. Lysenkoism's state monopoly was framed in more pragmatic terms: 'Michurin biology works, Mendelist-Morganist biology does not.'

There is no evidence to suggest that Mao saw the ideological merit of Lysenkoism. This may be because science and ideology had remained separate fields in the PRC prior to the introduction of Lysenkoism. 'Revolutionary science' received lukewarm reception and remained poorly understood. Indeed, it may not have occurred to Mao to link Lysenkoist heredity with reforming the bourgeoisie, especially considering the relative unimportance of the latter in China's political configuration. The CPC likely did not connect Lysenkoist heredity with the long-term transition to a stateless society given immediate exigencies. In 1952,

Mao noted that the PRC would finish transitioning to socialism in 'ten or fifteen' years. The subsequent transition to communism faded in the face of more pressing issues.

The role of ideology in Lysenkoism's rise was highly variable across the Soviet Union and China. In the former, Stalin found Lysenkoism to be useful for achieving a stateless society. However, Stalin could not voice his explicit support on these terms given his short-term goals of strengthening the state. In China, Lysenkoism was not considered beyond agronomy. This disparity is most aptly explained through the two countries' adoption and abandonment of partisanship in science, the idea that scientific principles must serve and reflect the state under which they were created. As the next section of the essay will demonstrate, between 1930 and 1948 the Soviet Union adopted this doctrine before transitioning to the principle of *nauchnost'*, a pursuit of materialism in science and recognition that some sciences should remain outside of party expertise and intervention. The rise of Lysenkoism on ideological grounds in the Soviet Union coincided with the promotion of *partiinnost'*, in which science and ideology were intermarried. The rise of Lysenkoism in China happened in the early 1950s, well after *nauchnost'* had been adopted. Given that science need not strictly adhere to communist theory, Mao never made the connection between the two.

Lysenkoism and partisanship in science

In 1930, Ernst Kol'man, a scientist and spokesman for Stalinist Marxism, bluntly informed the mathematical community of their ideological obligations:

'Under the dictatorship of the proletariat neither philosophy nor any other discipline can exist in isolation from politics and Party leadership. [All fields] cannot be separated either from the philosophy of dialectical materialism or from the policies of our Party.'

In other words, 'revolutionary science' was subservient to the needs of the communist party and must adhere to dialectical materialism. It needed to remain consonant with the party's worldview and reflect the state under which it had been created. Any attempt to establish the independence of science was inherently reactionary. This was partisanship in science, or *partiinnost'*.

Partiinnost' did not merely target Soviet Mathematics, but extended across scientific fields, including biology. Lysenko recognized this. His 1935 joint publication with Isaak Izrailevich Present (1902-1969), *Plant Breeding and the Theory of Phasic Development*

of Plants, reflected this division between revolutionary and bourgeois science. Lysenko used this dichotomy to criticize classic genetics. He stated that issues with plant breeding lay in a faulty understanding of heredity, i.e. genetics, which had been inherited from 'bourgeois science.' To remedy this, Lysenko proposed building the Soviet Union's own theory 'on the basis of the materialist principles of development, which actually reflects the dialectics of heredity.' This Soviet theory of heredity would become Lysenkoism, which he dubbed Michurin Biology. This was a 'transformation of biology into a total metaphor.' For instance, the competition between different species was a metaphor for class struggle:

'Dense shoots of a particular species by their mass oppose other species in a struggle and at the same time ... do not compete with each other.'

The political backdrop of Lysenko's criticism of genetics was the 'second revolution', a period devoted to the construction of socialism. New industries based on state ownership deprived farmers of private land. This led to widespread peasant opposition and the destruction or withholding of produce. The Soviet Union faced an existential agricultural crisis. To combat this, it required politically-aligned, practical agronomists who could underscore for peasants the advantages of collectivized farming.

The methods of farming Lysenkoism offered to peasants were novel. The innovative Lysenkoist practice of vernalization enabled of plowing and planting in slack periods. For the first time, new collectivized farming techniques might overshadow land dispossession for peasants. On the other hand, genetics was incapable of providing something new as it remained highly theoretical into the 1930s. Lysenko promoted his hereditary ideology and agronomical technique under the guise of socialist agriculture, couching it in the rhetoric of *partiinnost'*. Peasants participating in Lysenkoist projects voluntarily became part of a great Soviet experiment and no longer posed a threat to the party's authority.

The *partiinnost'* of Lysenkoism was thus useful to the central committee because it brought dissenting peasants back into the fold of socialism. Lysenko's claim that his theories challenged the USSR's 'bourgeois' remnants attracted Stalin. In 1948, Lysenkoism received a state endorsed monopoly, announced at a session of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

However, a paradigm shift had occurred in the post-war years. Lysenko's ideology was no longer promoted under the banner of *partiinnost'*, but *nauchnost'*. *Nauchnost'* stressed scientific truthfulness over ideological adherence. Stalin came to recognize

that some areas of research constituted neither 'the base' nor 'the superstructure' of socialism. He began downplaying distinctions between 'bourgeois' and 'proletarian' science. This is most clearly reflected in Stalin's edits to Lysenko's 1948 speech. Lysenko's original line of argument for the adoption of his views emphasized their class character and the party's authority. When Lysenko wrote that 'any science is class-oriented by nature,' Stalin retorted, "Ha-Ha-Ha!!! And what about Mathematics? And Darwinism?" Stalin's downplaying of partisanship in science remained a trend that would continue until his death in 1953. This contrasted with Lysenkoism's adoption in China, which centered on agronomical practicality in the absence of *partiinnost'*.

Stalin published a series of articles in the 1950s stating his concern over scientific monopolists, stating that 'no science can develop... without freedom of criticism,' noting that 'Marxism is the enemy of all kinds of dogmatism.' This signaled greater official scrutiny of Lysenkoism. On 3 July 1952, a draft proposal by the Central Committee attacked Lysenkoism for 'serious defects' caused by Lysenko's dismissal of 'open criticism'. Even Stalin himself reportedly said in a 1950 private conversation, 'We are going to be criticizing [Lysenko].' In 1956, the party forced Lysenko to resign as president of the Agricultural Academy. Despite this, Lysenko retained Khrushchev's favor, and lost all prestige only after Brezhnev's succession. Lysenkoism's decline followed a gradual back-and-forth between Lysenkoites and geneticists.

State endorsement of Lysenkoism coincides almost exactly with *partiinnost'*'s elevation. Lysenkoism was favored during the early and middle years of Stalin's reign given the theory's ability to fit 'socialist agronomy' principles. In this way, Lysenkoism was a 'proletarian science.' However, Lysenkoism could not survive shifts during late Stalinism as the new doctrine of *nauchnost'* gained predominance. Thus, Lysenko was deemed reactionary, and his ideology was deified.

It is difficult to definitively state why the party changed its doctrine. One possible explanation is that the *partiinnost'* of Lysenkoism was no longer agriculturally useful. In 1940, collectivized farmland reached 99.8% of all arable land and the need for Lysenkoism to convince peasants to accept collectivization diminished. Another possibility is the increasing need to emphasize the universal foundations of communism. Global factors had begun to change the central committee's attitude to science. Science, the newest front of competition between the west and the USSR, remained an objective gauge of country-level development. Hence, scientific theories need to be judged solely on facts. Though science was

freed from the shackles of ideology, they were by no means separated. Instead, ideology followed science.

Unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the CPC never recognized *partiinnost'* in science. In 1952, the CPC clearly indicated in a *People's Daily* article that 'old biology' was not inherent 'reactionary.' Nevertheless, the party rejected genetics and outlawed critiques of Michurin Biology, 'Morgan is not desired; Michurin is.' Michurin Biology was seen as objective, comprising a 'central truth,' and thus the test case for adoption remained *nauchnost'*. However, the PRC remained reluctant to commit fully to Lysenkoism for fear of alienating native Chinese scientists. Thus, the *People's Daily* statement crucially forbade vigilante accusations on the grounds of reactionary scientific views. Michurin Biology was heralded as a revolutionary science *because* of its truth. Thus, *nauchnost'* dictated acceptance of Michurin Biology.

The Hundred Flowers Movement (HFM) ended Michurin Biology's prominence through de-politicization. Lu came to the same conclusion as Stalin at the 1956 Qingdao Symposium, determining that the natural sciences had no class character. This shift did not rest on accusations of being reactionary. Rather, it comprised a view of party neutrality in relation to competing scientific theories. Though Stalin partially adopted these views in the early 1950s, he never completely divorced political ideology from science. Instead, he reversed their roles in relation to one another. Thus, it remained possible for a scientific ideology to be reactionary under late Stalinism *because* it would impede scientific progress. This would be impossible in the PRC after the HFM. Instead, the party would refrain from intervening in scientific affairs.

By contrast, Michurin Biology would disappear rapidly and dramatically from the PRC once state support had been lifted. As the next two sections of the essay will demonstrate, while Lysenkoism continued to serve practical benefits for Khrushchev, it served none for Mao. Both Stalin and Khrushchev were able to utilize the doctrine of Lysenkoism to demonstrate the supremacy of Soviet science. Thus, Lysenkoism was artificially extended. For Mao, Lysenkoism became a liability. It initially had promised agricultural benefits and a symbol of Sino-Soviet cooperation. As tensions grew with the Soviet Union and with returning Chinese scientists from abroad, Lysenkoism became a target of scorn for most of the Chinese scientific community. Thus, Mao rescinded the special status of Lysenkoism before the 2nd Five-Year Plan in order to limit antagonism with the Chinese intelligentsia.

Lysenkoism, nationalism, and internationalism

Lysenko's infamous 1948 report at the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences underscored the idea of 'two worlds – two ideologies.' Lysenkoism was presented not just as a valid agronomical theory, but *the* correct agronomical ideology. It was a 'materialist,' 'Soviet biology,' which superseded 'idealist,' 'reactionary biology' in a scientific battle. The report bolstered Soviet nationalism and solidified the ever-present dichotomy between the west and the USSR.

In *Late Stalinism*, Evgeny Dobrenko argues that the Stalin-era USSR required a particular aesthetic, namely a set of principles governing beauty, to assert its own identity in opposition to the west. This aesthetic was Soviet Realism, an affirmation of the imminent triumph of collectivism and total victory of 'an ideal that was always situated in the future.' Soviet Realism permeated politics and facilitated its 'aestheticization.' Its infiltration of politics was so thorough that it found itself influencing science as well. Lysenkoism was a chief example of this.

Lysenko was a 'people's academician.' He came from a peasant background and worked tirelessly to improve agricultural yields in the Soviet government. Lysenko's ideology emanated from his core Soviet convictions. For the central committee, a large part of the appeal of Lysenkoism rested on the benefits derived from public belief in its agricultural successes. Lysenkoism did not just represent itself but emerged an emblem of the Soviet model of science. If Lysenkoism was right, it followed that the Soviet model of science was sound. For this reason, the promotion of Lysenkoism underscored the USSR's scientific supremacy.

This meant that backtracking would constitute an admission of defeat and error. Thus, the notion of 'two worlds – two ideologies' was never officially revoked, nor did Lysenkoism ever officially lose state support on the basis of scientific inaccuracy. Stalin and the central committee criticized Lysenkoism instead for being monopolistic. As a result, Lysenkoism enjoyed a revival under the Khrushchev regime and found obscurity only slowly.

The proclamation of the new People's Republic of China in 1949 was followed instantaneously by a pro-Soviet campaign to 'learn from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union'. Luo Tinayu, a senior party cadre, brought Michurin Biology into the Agricultural University of Beijing. Michurin Biology played a central role in propaganda meant to embellish Soviet science. Campaign literature used Lysenkoism to illustrate the USSR's scientific prowess in general. Michurin and Lysenko represented prominent Soviet

scientists *par excellence*.

The enthusiasm Michurin Biology initially received derived its authority from the Soviet Union's endorsement and it was poorly understood in China. This enthusiasm soon gave to half-hearted support, which itself would eventually be retracted.

Inspired by the micro-historical model, the trajectory of Bao Wenkui (1916-1995) exemplifies the PRC's lukewarm attitude towards Michurin Biology. Bao was a biologist abroad who returned to China to work for reconstruction after completing his doctorate on genetics and biochemistry at Caltech in 1950. Bao knew of Lysenko as early as 1949, but he did not expect to deal with Lysenkoism upon his return to China. Despite the central party's decision to back Michurin Biology, Bao found a position in Chengdu University, where government officials were open minded and receptive to his research in polyploidy, a genetic phenomenon describing the possession of more than two complete sets of chromosomes.

In 1953, Lysenkoite advisors arrived in Chengdu to oversee Bao's research. However, they were demonstrably unfamiliar with Bao's work, encouraging him to continue his investigations. Only in the winter of 1954 did a provincial meeting discover that Lysenko had condemned polyploid research many years ago. Bao's plots were immediately destroyed, and he was informed that he was forbidden from continuing his research.

Bao wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture in early 1955 concerning this incident. In June of the same year, Bao's institute was ordered to allow Bao to continue investigating polyploidy. In September 1956, *The People's Daily* used Bao as an example of the HFM's correction of injustices. Bao was given three quarters of a page to share his experiences. Before the end of the year, Bao had been appointed to the CAS and would work as a professor at Beijing Agricultural Institute until his death in 1980.

From its onset, the spread of Lysenkoism in China was limited and regional. A year after the party's appointment of a Lysenkoite in Beijing, the ideology had gained no traction in the southwest where Bao worked. This reflects the CPC's more limited approach to promoting Lysenkoism. Michurin Biology had spread to the northeast of China before the end of the Chinese Civil War. It entered Beijing in 1949 and would only arrive south in Sichun in 1953. This gradual spread reflected the CPC's cautious attitude towards Lysenkoism, motivated by a fear of alienating returning Chinese scientists. Several high-profile geneticists, such as Li Jingzhun, had already fled the country out of fear of prosecution.

The pedestal of 'superior Soviet science' Lysenkoism stood manifested in the dismissive attitudes of Soviet Lysenkoites to Chinese biology. In

1950, Zhu Xi, a member of the CAS Experimental Biology Institute, published a facetious summary of a talk he had with I. E. Glushchenko, a visiting Soviet Lysenkoite, in which the latter chastised Zhu for the 'Morganist' implications of an evolutionary paper he had written. Glushchenko warned Zhu that 'conclusions would continue to be lacking unless Chinese studied ...dialectical materialism.' Zhu's piece was the first in a growing genre of light criticism directed against Soviet scientific arrogance and reflected the growing disgruntlement of the Chinese intelligentsia. Fears of alienating Chinese scientists meant the CPC never dared give Michurin Biology its full support. Indeed, when Michurin Biology was taken off its pedestal at a 1956 national meeting, Premier Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) stated in reference to it that 'certain sectarian attitudes' have 'handicapped us in bringing ... the intelligentsia into full play.' Bao was a member of the intelligentsia who had been alienated by the party as a result of Lysenkoism's adoption. The CPC had recognized the divisiveness of promoting Michurin Biology and backtracked.

The Bao affair also reveals the lack of understanding Lysenkoite advisors had for his work. It took them significant time to realize that Lysenko would have deemed polyploid research reactionary. Following this realization, they forbade Bao's work after having offered implicit endorsement. This demonstrates not only a lack of deeper understanding of Michurin Biology, but also a blind adherence to its teachings. This adherence was another reason why the party stopped favoring Lysenkoism. As Lu warned, the PRC 'must not mechanically copy everything in the Soviet Union in a doctrinaire way.' The CPC was concerned with economic developments featured in the 2nd Five-Year Plan and had begun to worry that scientific over-dependency on the Soviet Union would hamper growth.

The rise of Lysenkoism in China was in part based on the promotion of 'advanced' Soviet science. However, fearing the estrangement of Chinese scientists, the CPC never fully committed to Lysenkoism. Even in the 1952 statement making Lysenkoism official state ideology, scientists were never obliged to teach Lysenkoism as had been in the Soviet Union. The official reasons for endorsing Michurin Biology centered on its pragmatic value, in opposition to the theoretical and false theory of genetics. The CPC strove to find a balance between developing its own scientists and pursuing an agronomical doctrine that Mao believed would improve yields. Initially, this had reflected a blind faith in the superiority of Soviet science, which shattered in 1955 in the face of Hans Stubbe's evidence of Lysenko's falsified claims and results. In the following year, the disillusioned CPC no longer had to weigh the

benefits of Lysenkoism against a wary intelligentsia. The former had been shown to be ineffective, while the latter remained key to economic development in the second five-year plan. Unlike in the Soviet Union, Lysenkoism did not have any effect in buttressing nationalist proclivities in China. Thus, Lysenkoism could be disposed of delicately as the party absented itself from the realm of science.

To what extent was Lysenkoism pursued on purely agronomical grounds?

Lysenko's initial claim to fame in the USSR had been the introduction of vernalization and the increased grain output it promised. Lysenko's pitch had come at a critical time for the Soviet Union. Between 1927-28, five million hectares of wheat had perished from the cold during winter. Unlike geneticists who sat around miniscule experimental plots, Lysenko's vernalization constituted a practical plan of action. Thus, before his tests had even begun, vernalization and Lysenkoism were being heralded as a solution to winter killing of crops. In the following year, Stalin made a speech decrying 'theoretical work,' instead commending 'practical success achieved in socialist construction.' The message was clear: the Soviet Union had patience only for pragmatic results.

However, boosting agricultural production was not the only way Lysenkoism offered practical benefits for the communist party. The early 1930s brought unrest among the peasantry due to collectivization. In response, Lysenkoism promised new agricultural techniques. Regardless of their efficacy, they brought peasants back into the socialist fold.

Even after Lysenkoism proved agronomically unhelpful, the Soviet Union continued to promote it up to 1950, even going so far as to codify its irrefutability in Lysenko's infamous 1948 address. Though Lysenkoism had been deprived of its role in agronomical production, it continued to fill a different role for Stalin, a promotion of Soviet supremacy through the aesthetic of Soviet Realism. If the central committee could convince the Soviet people that Lysenkoism had superseded western biology, then by extension they would believe that Soviet science remained superior. *Partiinost'* buttressed this idea by declaring Soviet science inherently revolutionary, while denigrating western science as reactionary. In the wake of World War II, Stalin recognized the importance of truth in science as a means to evaluate and compare the development of nations. Thus, instead of science requiring state approval, the state came to rely on scientific legitimacy. At the same time, the state needed to stand by Lysenkoism lest their people believe western science had the upper hand: domestic support was at stake.

The benefits of Lysenkoism towards building a stateless society must also not be ignored. Though Stalin was never able to announce Lysenkoism as a bridge between socialism and communism out of concerns it would diminish his state building goals, he nevertheless subtly recognized how Lysenkoist means could facilitate a stateless society.

In China, Lysenkoism fascinated Mao because given its promise of maximizing agricultural production through harnessing different natural factors. Because of this, Mao imported Lysenkoism from the Soviet Union and used it as a flagship to promote awareness of Soviet science among Chinese scientists in order to stimulate China's economic capabilities.

Despite the CPC's fascination, they neither fully embraced nor fully understood Lysenkoism. This stemmed from two factors. First, the CPC never conceptualized partisanship in science. Lysenkoism served fewer ideological purposes in China. Instead, it remained intimately linked to grain production. Second, native Chinese scientists were alienated by the CPC's pandering to the Soviet Union. Mao needed to weigh the benefits of higher wheat yields against the costs of alienating domestic scientists. Thus, he took a limited approach to the implementation of Lysenkoism in China, increasing its influence gradually and regionally.

Lysenkoism had none of the ideological trappings in China that had been present in the USSR, given the absence of *partiinost'*. The validity of the theory lay only in its scientific truth. Thus, Hans Stubbe's 1955 critique paved the way for Lysenkoism's fall. This was only further underscored by Mao's 1956 reassessment of the role of the Soviet Union in Chinese development. He reasoned that overreliance would only cause economic blunders during China's 2nd Five Year Plan. Thus, Lysenkoism descended to parity with genetics. Chinese scientists ripped it apart themselves thereafter.

Conclusion

The crucial difference between rise and fall of Lysenkoism in the USSR and PRC concerned Lysenkoism utility over and above its agricultural implications. Lysenkoism remained useful for Stalin and Khrushchev because it strengthened the idea of Soviet scientific supremacy, constituting a valuable tool in demonstrating socialism's scientific prowess. In addition, it offered a potential bridge between socialism and communism. Thus, it was ferociously promoted even when its basic tenets had been proven false, fading only gradually. For Mao, Lysenkoism's promise lay in increased agricultural output. At the same time, it alienated Chinese scientists. Further, Mao

came to worry about overdependence on Soviet science stymieing Chinese scientific development. Thus, he promoted Lysenkoism cautiously and withdrew support once it had been shown to be false.

The paradigm conjoining science and ideology drove the distinct treatments of Lysenkoism. The USSR, from the inception of Soviet Realism to the assumption of *nauchnost'*, had always justified scientific theories in relation to socialism's power. The intimate connection between these spheres made it possible to repurpose an agronomical ideology into a propagandistic tool, something the intellectual conditions in the PRC did not facilitate.

this study finds conclusions of wider relevance by examination the conditions of Lysenko's rise and fall; namely, how the forces of nationalism, domestic politics, and foreign competition influence how a state understands the wider scientific field and judges ideas useful or not.

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News From History Society

History Society continues to run a comprehensive programme of events.

Short Half saw our highlight of the year so far: a well-attended talk by Sir Anthony Beevor on the Russian Revolution. Other talks were organised by the local branch of the Historical Association. At the end of the term, we held our first ever quiz, piloting a picture round, and a source round on Oliver Cromwell and Christmas. We also published an edition of the Winchester History Journal which was dedicated to HM Queen Elizabeth II.

With a new team now running the society, a book-review evening in Moberly Library began our Common Time schedule. The large number of books presented means that we plan on repeating the event every term. During the term, we had lectures by pupils, including Douglas Page on “Thomas Becket through Books” and James Hunter on “Culture, Language and Identity in the Japanese Empire”, as well as those organised by the local branch of the Historical Association. Members of the society produced excellent resources for a tutor hour on LGBT History, and a collaboration with FlicSoc was realised with a screening of *Thirteen Days* (2000). The end of term saw another quiz, but by popular request, on the online platform, Kahoot.


A recent development in History Society has been a page on the Pupil Hub, although still in its infancy. Currently, the past editions of the Winchester History Journal and our programme are available on the site, as well as resources from some events. For example, the end-of-term quiz questions are now available. A small taster of the questions is available from page 46 of this publication, but do go to the Pupil Hub (perhaps using the QR code below) to see the rest of the questions and to find out what else is available. It is our intention to upload recordings of lectures and even more to the page in the future.

Anyone interested in getting involved in the society, or writing for the Winchester History Journal, should in the first instance email Douglas Page at D_Page@wincoll.ac.uk. Cloister Time has many events planned, including a trip to the Winchester College Archives.



Answers to the quiz (from page 46):
Round 1: b, a/c, a, a
Round 2: False, False, False
Round 3: (clockwise from top left) Henry VIII, Charles I, Charles II, Elizabeth I
Round 4: c, c

Crossword



Across:

- 2. Nickname of William II (5)
- 5. Associated with Marx (6)
- 6. Famous pharaoh (11)
- 7. Wittenberg resident (6)
- 8. Elder brother of William II (6)
- 11. Huge, ship, related to some gods (7)
- 14. Site of William II's body (10,9)
- 16. Pictured (7)
- 17. Destroyed in 79AD (7)
- 19. Capital of the Inca Empire (5)





Down:





- 1. US President during the Korean War (6)
- 3. City where Richard III was recently discovered (9)
- 4. First president of the USA (10)
- 9. Ancient Greek historian (10)
- 10. François-Marie Arouet (8)
- 12. Site of William II's death (3,6)
- 13. Ancient Greek historian (9)
- 15. President during the 1920s (8)
- 18. Wife of Æthelred the Unready (4)

Answers on page 46.

Books From Moberly Library

Moberly Library has a wide selection of history books, as showcased in the History Society's termly book-review evening. Find our recommendations on these pages.





Quiz!

The following quiz questions were taken from the History Society end-of-term quiz. Find the rest of the questions via the Pupil Hub, perhaps by scanning the QR code on page 42. The answers are also at the bottom of page 42.

Round 1: Ancient — Sources

The following questions depend upon the sources opposite (on page 47).

1. Why was source A primarily made?

- a) To justify fathers enslaving their children b) To deter people from disowning their parents

2. What is a “shekel”?

- a) A unit of weight b) A shackle c) A unit of currency d) An animal

3. What is Nebuchadnezzar well-known for being?

- a) A biblical character b) An author c) A philosopher d) An Egyptian pharaoh

4. Is Source C or D rarer, and why?

- a) Source C, because it is older b) Source D, because of Nebuchadnezzar

Round 2: Medieval — True or False

1. Vikings had horns on their helmets.
2. Very few people lived over the age 60 in medieval England.
3. Thomas Becket knew William of Wykeham.

Round 3: Early Modern — Picture Round

Which monarchs are depicted on the back cover?

Round 4: Modern — Facts

1. What major event happened in London in 1851?

- a) Great Fire b) Great Flood c) Great Exhibition d) Great Escape

2. Where was Martin Luther King’s “I Have A Dream” speech?

- a) New York b) New Orleans c) Washington DC d) London

Answers to this edition's crossword (on page 43):
Across: 2. Rufus 5. (Friedrich) Engels; 6. Tutankhamun; 7. (Martin) Luther; 10. Robert (Curthoise); 11. Titanic; 14. Winchester Cathedral; 16. (Vittorio) Orlando; 17. Pompeii; 19. Cusco.
Down: 1. (Harry) Truman; 3. Leicester; 4. (George) Washington; 9. Thucydides; 10. Voltaire; 12. New Forest; 13. Herodotus; 15. (Calvin) Coolidge; 18. Emma (of Normandy).

Slavery in Mesopotamia, c. 2300-550 BC

Source A – Fragment of an Ancient Babylonian Law

If a son say to his father, "You are not my father," he [the father] can cut off his [the son's] locks, make him a slave and sell him for money. If a son say to his mother, "You are not my mother," she can cut off his locks, turn him out of town, or (at least) drive him away from home, deprive him of citizenship and of inheritance, but his liberty he loses not.

Source B – Fragment of a Neo-Babylonian Law

If a man sell a slave girl for money, and another party proves just claims to her, and takes her away from her present owner, the seller shall return the money to the buyer, to exactly the same amount that his receipt calls for; if in the meanwhile she has borne children, he shall in addition pay for each child one half shekel.

Source C – Contract for the Sale of a Slave, Reign of Rim-Sin, c. 2300 BC

Sini-Ishtar has bought a slave, Ea-tappi by name, from Ilu-elatti, and Akhia, his son, and has paid ten shekels of Silver, the price agreed. Ilu-elatti, and Akhia, his son, will not set up a future claim on the slave. [...] The tenth of Kisilimu, the year when Rim-Sin, the king, overcame the hostile enemies.

Source D – Contract for the Sale of a Slave, Eighth Year of Nebuchadnezzar II, 597 BC

Shamash-Uballit and Ubartum, children of Zakir, the son of Pashi-ummani, of their free-will have delivered Nanakirat and her unsveaned son, their slave, for nineteen shekels of money, for the price agreed, unto Kaçir and Nadin-Marduk, sons of Iqisha-aplu, son of Nur-Sin. Shamash-uballit and Ubartum guarantee against insubordination, the claim of the royal service, and emancipation. [...] Babylon, twenty-first of Kisilimu, eighth year of Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon.

